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Abstract
We pursue an inverse approach to utility theory and consumption &
investment problems. Instead of specifying an agent’s utility function
and deriving her actions, we assume we observe her actions (i.e. her con-
sumption and investment strategies) and ask if it is possible to derive a
utility function for which the observed behaviour is optimal. We work
in continuous time both in a deterministic and stochastic setting. In the
deterministic setup, we find that there are infinitely many utility func-
tions generating a given consumption pattern. In the stochastic setting
of the Black-Scholes complete market it turns out that the consumption
and investment strategies have to satisfy a consistency condition (PDE) if
they are to come from a classical utility maximisation problem. We show
further that important characteristics of the agent such as her attitude
towards risk (e.g. DARA) can be deduced directly from her consump-
tion/investment choices.
1 Introduction
The study of investment and consumption problems in finance has a long his-
tory, and there is large literature relating to these problems. In general, how-
ever, the set-up and solution of the problems take the following form: specify a
utility function which describes the investor’s ‘desire’ for wealth/consumption,
and then solve a stochastic optimisation problem to find the optimal investment
and consumption behaviour. Unfortunately, although we can postulate a simple
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parametric form for the utility function, and hope to deduce correspondingly
simple forms for the optimal consumption/investment strategies, it is difficult
to justify any claim that such a utility function accurately represents the pref-
erences of the agent. Moreover, attempts to elicit utility functions directly are
notoriously difficult, and prone to paradoxes and inconsistencies.
In this work we approach consumption/investment problems from a different,
and possibly more natural, perspective. Rather than supposing that we have
previously divined an investor’s utility function, we suppose that we know their
future consumption and investment patterns, and ask whether we can compute
a corresponding utility function from the given behaviour. We believe that there
are a number of reasons why this is a natural question to ask:
• consumption and investment strategies are ‘observables’ in that they can
actually be measured from investors’ actions, and therefore they are a
more natural concept around which to build a model than the intangible
utility function;
• the framework will allow us to see how natural behaviour patterns in
the consumption/investment setting relate to properties of the underlying
utility function;
• the analysis mirrors the robust approach to pricing and hedging (cf. Cox
and Ob lo´j (2010); Hobson (2010)) where one takes the vanilla option prices
as observables and attempts to infer information about the prices of exotics
and the dynamics of the price process of the underlying.
Our general question regarding how much information about an agent’s pref-
erences and optimality criteria we can recover from her behaviour and choices
falls under the heading of revealed preferences in Economics. It dates back (at
least) to Samuelson (1948) and is sufficiently central and important that it de-
serves an entry in the New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics (Richter (2008)).
Other related work in the economics literature includes Green and Srivastava
(1985), who consider when a given consumption may be optimal for a utility
maximising investor in a one-period, finite state model, and Mas-Colell (1977),
where the observed quantities are the demand functions of consumers, and the
aim is to recover the consumers’ preferences. In the financial literature a similar
“reversed” point of view was adopted by Dybvig and Rogers (1997) who consid-
ered the recovery of an agent’s utility function from a single realisation of her
consumption path, working under the (strong) assumption of time homogeneity
of agent’s utility function.
The closest to our work are papers of Black (1968), Cox and Leland (2000)
and He and Huang (1994)1. These three papers considered the ‘inverse Merton
problem’ on a finite time horizon while we consider the infinite horizon case.
However the results are close in spirit. One of our main results in the continuous
time Black-Scholes market setting is that consumption/investment strategies are
compatible with a utility maximisation framework if and only if they satisfy a
certain PDE. We call this Black’s PDE as it was first derived in Black (1968).
1We thank Thaleia Zariphopoulou who indicated these valuable references to us when this
article neared completion. The manuscript Black (1968) was published in a modified form as
Black (1988), Cox and Leland (2000) was circulated informally in the 1980s, see Editor’s note
therein.
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It was then re-derived using discrete time arguments in Cox and Leland (2000).
The analysis was then extended and made rigorous in a remarkable paper of He
and Huang (1994). The key novelties of our paper are firstly in considering an
infinite horizon, which requires dealing with the budget constraint and finiteness
of the value function, and secondly in offering a unified, mathematically rigorous
treatment of the problem. Moreover, we give several examples, and we show
that they satisfy the sufficiency conditions of the theorem. This seems very
difficult in the set-up of the pre-exisiting literature.
We make more detailed comments about the relationship between our work
and that of Black (1968), Cox and Leland (2000) and He and Huang (1994) in
Remark 3.8 below. We note also that the main result linking an agent’s action
via a PDE is similar in spirit to results in Wang (1993). However in Wang
(1993) a full equilibrium model for a representative agent is considered and we
have a partial equilibrium for a price taking agent.
The paper is organised as follows. In the first part of the paper, Section
2, we work in a deterministic setup. After the problem setup and a heuristic
derivation of the solution, the main theorem is given in Section 2.3. In Section
2.4 we analyse what can be deduced from agents’ consumption about their risk
attitudes and present explicit examples. Finally, Section 2.5 comments on our
assumptions and the resulting restrictions. As well as being interesting in its
own right, this section brings insight to the stochastic problem, by showing what
we might expect or not expect to be able to recover about u. Nonetheless, there
are also fundamental differences.
In the second part of the paper, Sections 3 and 4, we work in the stochastic
setting of a Black-Scholes market. Sections 3.1 and 3.2 give a heuristic derivation
of the main result using the primal and the dual approach respectively. The
main theorem and its proof are then given in Section 3.3.
Section 4 contains a discussion of some consequences of the main theorem
and an extension. Section 4.1 asks what happens if the parameters of the Black-
Scholes financial market are not known, and in particular asks if it is possible
to recover the volatility and Sharpe ratio from the actions of the agent. Section
4.2 discusses the implication for reading off the risk attitudes of agents from
their actions. Section 4.3 focuses on the case of time-homogenous strategies and
presents explicit examples where consumption and investment are not linear in
wealth. Finally, Section 4.4 discusses a relaxation of the assumptions of the
main theorem and in particular includes the case when an agent’s consumption
and possibly his wealth are uniformly bounded. Two examples are presented.
Section 5 presents possible extensions of our work and future challenges.
Notation. We make the following notational assumptions: throughout, an
optimal consumption strategy will be denoted by c(t, w), where t is the current
time, and w the investors wealth at time t. Similarly, an optimal investment
strategy (in terms of the cash amount invested in a risky asset) will be pi(t, w).
A general consumption and investment process will be (Ct,Πt). All stochastic
processes will be denoted by capital letters. Partial derivatives will be written
cw(t, w) and ct(t, w). There should be no confusion over subscripts t since
applied to a (upper case) process it refers to a time parameter, and applied to
a (lower case) function it is a derivative.
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2 Deterministic setting
2.1 Problem set-up
We begin by considering the case where there is no stochastic investment op-
portunity, so that we only observe the investor’s consumption over an infinite
horizon. More specifically, suppose we know that the investor who has wealth
w at time t will consume an amount c(t, w)dt in the time interval t, t + dt,
where c(t, w) ≥ 0, and suppose that we work in a situation with no interest
on savings (or equivalently, all amounts are discounted back to their time-zero
values). Then an investor with initial wealth x ≥ 0 will have time-t wealth
w(t, x) described by:
wt(t, x) = −c(t, w(t, x))
w(0, x) = x.
(1)
Further, we impose that the budget constraint w(t, x) ≥ 0 holds for all x and t,
or, in terms of c(t, w), that:∫ ∞
0
c(t, w(t, x))dt ≤ x.
Our main concern is then the following. Suppose c(t, w) is as above, and
suppose we are told c(t, w(t, x)) is optimal for the problem:
v(x) = sup
Ct≥0,∫∞
0
Ctdt≤x
∫ ∞
0
u(t, Ct) dt, (2)
where the supremum is taken over processes (Ct)t≥0. What can we infer about
the function u?
2.2 Heuristics
By introducing a Lagrangian term into (2) we get:
v(x) = inf
λ≥0
sup
Ct≥0
[∫ ∞
0
u(t, Ct) dt− λ
(∫ ∞
0
Ct dt− x
)]
= inf
λ≥0
sup
Ct≥0
[∫ ∞
0
(u(t, Ct)− λ(x)Ct) dt+ xλ(x)
]
.
In the second line we write λ = λ(x) to emphasise that λ will depend on the
initial wealth.
Hence, for the optimal Ct, we get (supposing that u is suitably differentiable):
uc(t, c(t, w(t, x))) = λ(x), (3)
where the optimality of λ implies vx(x) = λ(x). Moreover, if we differentiate
(3) again, we get:
ucc(t, c(t, w(t, x))) = − D(x)∂
∂x [c(t, w(t, x))]
, (4)
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where D(x) = −λx(x) = −vxx(x). To then find ucc(t, c), we need to assume
that we can recover x as a function of c and t. This will be the case if we
assume that c(t, w) is increasing as a function of w. It seems to be a fairly
natural assumption to make in terms of investor behaviour, although note that
the assumption does then imply |w(t, x0)−w(t, x1)| is decreasing in t — that is,
the ‘wealth paths’ corresponding to different initial wealths are ‘getting closer
together’ as time increases. Moreover, one could imagine paths corresponding
to two different initial wealths merge at some later point. To rule out such
behaviour we will also impose that ∂∂xc(t, w(t, x)) > 0. Note as well that if this
is combined with the assumption that D(x) > 0 (or equivalently that the value
function is concave in x) we will have u concave — or a decreasing marginal
utility of additional consumption. Since these all seem fairly plausible economic
assumptions, we will work from this point on under these assumptions.
Finally, observe that u will necessarily be undetermined at least up to ad-
dition of a function of the form A(t) + Bc and we would not expect to fully
recover u from (4).
Example 2.1. CRRA: Suppose the optimal consumption strategy is: c(t, w) =
κw, for some κ > 0 — so the investor consumes a constant proportion of her
wealth, and that she always consumes all of her wealth. Then it follows that
w(t, x) = xe−κt and c(t, w(t, x)) = κxe−κt, and we can invert this to see that if
she is consuming c at time t, then her initial wealth was cκe
κt. Hence we get:
ucc(s, c) = −
D
(
c
κe
κt
)
κe−κt
.
Motivated by our knowledge of the form of the solution in the CRRA case,
suppose we assume further that D(x) = −vxx(x) = γx−γ−1 for some positive
γ. Then
ucc(t, c) =
−γ ( cκeκt)−γ−1
κe−κt
= −γκγe−γκtc−γ−1
Integrating this expression in c, we get:
uc(t, c) = c
−γκγe−γκt + β(t) =
(
κxe−κt
)−γ
κγe−γκt + β(t)
= x−γ + β(t),
but by (3), we know this expression must be independent of t, i.e. β(t) ≡ β,
and integrating once more, we get (provided γ 6= 1):
u(t, c) =
c−γ+1κγe−γκt
1− γ +A(t) + βc
where A is an unknown function of time, and β is a constant. Note that these will
not affect the choice of the optimal strategies derived from the utility function
(assuming that
∫∞
0
A(t) dt is finite).
We remark that in the above example, we could have chosen any positive
function D(·), and we would end up with the corresponding value function at
time 0 given by vxx(x) = −D(x), with exactly the same optimal consumption
paths. This suggests we can interpret the paths (t, c(t, w(t, x))) as the contours
5
where the gradient of u is constant, while the function D encodes our relative
valuation of the different paths. Knowledge of consumption paths does not
reveal the relative valuations of the different paths since there is no natural way
of comparing the path with initial wealth x and the path with initial wealth
y, simply from the specification of the optimal paths. Specifying the function
D(·), however, does give an indication as to the relative valuation of the different
paths, and in order to recover u(t, c), we would expect to need to specify this
function. We come back to this issue below in Section 2.4 and Example 2.8.
Parallels in the setting where a risky asset is traded and an agent also has to
specify her investment strategy are drawn in Remark 3.6 in Section 3.
2.3 Main results
Before we transform the above remarks into a theorem, we also note that there
may be a ‘maximal’ solution to (1), given by w¯(t) = supx≥0 w(t, x) which may
be finite for t > 0. In such a case, there is a ‘maximal’ wealth path which comes
down from infinity in finite time, and since we assume we only see behaviour from
time zero, we will not observe any behaviour at higher wealths, and therefore at
higher consumptions than c¯(t) = supx≥0 c(t, w(t, x)). Thus we will not be able to
infer features of u for levels of consumption above c¯(t). Some thought confirms
that c¯(t) may be finite even if w¯(t) is equal to infinity for all t. Mathematically,
we will represent this fact by assuming the function u(t, c) is constant above
c¯(t), but note that there may be other possible choices of u which produce the
same optimal choice of c and w.
Theorem 2.2. Suppose we are given functions {c(t, w) : w ∈ R+, t ≥ 0} such
that c(t, 0) ≡ 0, c(t, w) is locally Lipschitz continuous and strictly increasing in
w. Let w(t, x) be the (unique) solution to:
wt(t, x) = −c(t, w(t, x))
w(0, x) = x,
(5)
and suppose that ∫ ∞
0
c(t, w(t, x))dt = x,
and the function ∂∂xc(t, w(t, x)) exists and is strictly positive. Then there exists
a function u(t, c) such that uc(t, c) ≥ 0 and ucc(t, c) ≤ 0, for which the problem:
v(x) = sup
Ct≥0:∫∞
0
Ct dt≤x
∫ ∞
0
u(t, Ct) dt (6)
is uniquely solved by the choice of consumption: Ct = c(t, w(t, x)) for each
x ≥ 0.
Remark 2.3. In fact, as we shall see, there is a family of solutions u for which
the choice Ct = c(t, w(t, x)) is optimal. It should also be clear from the proof
that Theorem 2.2 could be modified into an if and only if statement, albeit more
technical and complicated than the current version.
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Proof. Define c¯(t) = supx≥0 c(t, w(t, x)), then for 0 ≤ c < c¯(t), we can find a
unique x such that c = c(t, w(t, x)). Write this as y(t, c), and note therefore
that y(t, c(t, w(t, x))) = x, and y(t, c¯(t)) = ∞. Also, by the assumption that
∂
∂xc(t, w(t, x)) exists and is strictly positive, y(t, c) is a differentiable function of
c with derivative
yc(t, c) =
1
∂
∂xc(t, w(t, x))
∣∣
x=y(t,c)
.
Let D(x) be a strictly positive function satisfying∫ ∞
x
D(y) dy <∞, for every x > 0. (7)
Then we can define a function u by:
uc(t, c) =

∫ c¯(t)
c
D(y(t,κ))
∂
∂x c(t,w(t,x))|x=y(t,κ) dκ : c ≤ c¯(t)
0 : c > c¯(t)
, (8)
where (7) ensures that the integral is finite for c > 0. Indeed, using the substi-
tution ξ = y(t, κ), we get:
uc(t, c) =
∫ c¯(t)
c
D(y(t, κ))
∂
∂xc(t, w(t, x))
∣∣
x=y(t,κ)
dκ
=
∫ y(t,c¯(t))=∞
y(t,c)
D(ξ)
∂
∂xc(t, w(t, x))
∣∣
x=ξ
∂
∂x
c(t, w(t, x))
∣∣∣∣
x=ξ
dξ
=
∫ ∞
y(t,c)
D(ξ) dξ. (9)
Then uc(t, c) ≥ 0 and ucc(t, c) ≤ 0 so that u(t, c) is strictly concave in c. Also,
writing c = c(t, w(t, x)) we find
uc(t, c(t, w(t, x))) =
∫ ∞
x
D(ξ) dξ. (10)
Now we consider a general consumption path Ct satisfying
∫∞
0
Ctdt ≤ x.
Then, using the concavity of u(t, ·) and (10), we conclude:∫ ∞
0
[u (t, Ct)− u(t, c(t, w(t, x)))] dt (11)
≤
∫ ∞
0
uc(t, c(t, w(t, x)))(Ct − c(t, w(t, x))) dt
=
(∫ ∞
x
D(ξ) dξ
)∫ ∞
0
(Ct − c(t, w(t, x))) dt
≤ 0
where the budget constraint gives the final step. Hence the given c(t, w(t, x))
is the optimal path as required. Finally, the inequality in (11) is strict, since
D(x) is strictly positive, unless c(t, w(t, x)) = Ct; hence c(t, w(t, x)) is also the
unique optimal solution.
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2.4 Inferring risk aversion from optimal consumption
So far, we have discussed the derivation of a utility function from an initial choice
of consumption behaviour. Can we extend this, and say something about some
other classical methods of describing investor behaviour? For example, a natural
question in this direction would be: given a set of consumption paths can we
determine whether the investor has decreasing absolute/relative risk aversion?
As already observed in Section 2.2 above, it turns out that specifying the con-
sumption paths alone is not sufficient. We present examples below of two utility
functions, one with decreasing absolute risk aversion and one with increasing
absolute risk aversion, which yield the same optimal consumptions paths. In
essence, consumption alone does not tell us how the investor compares differ-
ent wealths. This is specified by the additional function D. We can think of
D(x) (or more accurately
∫∞
x
D(y) dy) as determining the relative weightings of
different initial wealths: when D(x) is large, the additional utility of an agent
from a small increase in initial wealth above x is large, when D(x) is small,
the additional utility is also small. In what follows, we say that an agent with
consumption paths c(t, w) has relative weighting of initial wealths D(x) if D(x)
is differentiable, satisfies (7), and the agent’s utility is specified via (10).
We start with a simple observation about the role of the function D.
Note 2.4. The Inada condition — that is, that for all t, uc(t, c) takes all values
in [0,∞), is equivalent to ∫∞
x
D(y)dy ↑ ∞ as x ↓ 0.
We now analyse in detail the risk aversion of the investor. We concentrate
on absolute risk aversion, but we observe that similar results can be derived for
relative risk aversion.
Definition 2.5. For a utility function u, the absolute risk aversion is given by
ρ(t, c) = −ucc(t, c)
uc(t, c)
.
We say that an investor is DARA (decreasing absolute risk aversion) if ρc(t, c) ≤
0 for all t, c ≥ 0. Similarly, we say an investor is CARA (constant absolute risk
aversion) or IARA (increasing absolute risk aversion) if respectively ρc(t, c) = 0
or ρc(t, c) ≥ 0, for all t, c ≥ 0.
Recall that u is recovered only up to an affine function. We should note that
our normalisation uc(t,∞) = 0, or more precisely limx→∞ uc(t, c(t, w(t, x))) = 0,
which is implicit in the equation (3) and explicit in (10), and follows from the use
of c¯(t) as a reference point in (8), has a consequence on the value of the function
ρ(t, c). A different reference point might change the absolute risk aversion.
Proposition 2.6. Suppose an investor has consumption paths c(t, w) and rel-
ative weighting of initial wealths D(x). Then the sign of ρc(t, c) is the same as
the sign of:
Dx(x)
D(x)
+
D(x)∫∞
x
D(y) dy
−
∂2
∂x2 c(t, w(t, x))
∂
∂xc(t, w(t, x))
≡ ∂
∂x
ln
(
D(x)
∂
∂xc(t, w(t, x))
∫∞
x
D(y) dy
)
,
evaluated at x = y(t, c).
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Corollary 2.7. An investor is DARA if and only if:
Dx(x)
D(x)
+
D(x)∫∞
x
D(y) dy
≤ inf
t≥0
∂2
∂x2 c(t, w(t, x))
∂
∂xc(t, w(t, x))
, x > 0. (12)
An investor is CARA if and only if
Dx(x)
D(x)
+
D(x)∫∞
x
D(y) dy
=
∂2
∂x2 c(t, w(t, x))
∂
∂xc(t, w(t, x))
so that in particular, the right hand side of the equation is independent of t.
Finally an investor is IARA if and only if:
Dx(x)
D(x)
+
D(x)∫∞
x
D(y) dy
≥ sup
t≥0
∂2
∂x2 c(t, w(t, x))
∂
∂xc(t, w(t, x))
, x > 0. (13)
Proof of Proposition 2.6. It follows from (10) that:
ρ(t, c(t, w(t, x))) =
D(x)
∂
∂xc(t, w(t, x))
∫∞
x
D(y) dy
.
Since c(t, w(t, x)) is increasing in x, ρ(t, c) is increasing in c if and only if the
right-hand-side of the above expression is increasing in x, if and only if the
logarithm of the right-hand-side is increasing in x.
Example 2.8. Consider the consumption function of Example 2.1, so that
c(t, w) = κw and c(t, w(t, x)) = κxe−κt. Then:
∂2
∂x2 c(t, w(t, x))
∂
∂xc(t, w(t, x))
= 0.
If we consider a function D(x) = γx−γ−1 with γ > 0, then
Dx(x)
D(x)
+
D(x)∫∞
x
D(y) dy
= − 1
x
< 0,
so the corresponding investor is DARA. On the other hand, for the choice
D(x) = xe−ηx
2
with η > 0,
Dx(x)
D(x)
+
D(x)∫∞
x
D(y) dy
=
1
x
> 0,
and the investor is IARA. The case D(x) = e−ζx gives a CARA investor. Note
that in the last two cases we necessarily have u(t,∞) <∞, whereas in the first
case the finiteness of u(t,∞) depends on the sign of (γ − 1).
Example 2.9. The purpose of this example is to show that explicit answers may
still be available beyond the CRRA case in which consumption is proportional
to wealth. Again we find that knowledge of the consumption path alone is not
sufficient to determine the attitude to risk.
9
Suppose we have a concave, increasing function G(z) of class C3 and such
that G(0) = 0, Gz(0) = 1 and G(z)/z → 0 as z → ∞. Let w(t, x) = 1tG(xt).
Then it follows that w(0, x) = x and:
c(t, w(t, x)) = − ∂
∂t
[
1
t
G(xt)
]
=
1
t2
[G(xt)− xtGz(xt)] = w
t
− 1
t2
G−1(tw)Gz(G−1(tw))
which is positive by concavity. In particular, we get:
∂2
∂x2 c(t, w(t, x))
∂
∂xc(t, w(t, x))
=
1
x
+ t
Gzzz(xt)
Gzz(xt)
One simple example of such a function is G(z) = ln(1 + z), in which case we
get c(t, w) = 1t2 (tw + e
−wt − 1) and:
∂2
∂x2 c(t, w(t, x))
∂
∂xc(t, w(t, x))
=
1
x
− 2t
1 + xt
.
This expression is decreasing in t, so we can conclude that
inf
t≥0
∂2
∂x2 c(t, w(t, x))
∂
∂xc(t, w(t, x))
= lim
t→∞
[
1
x
− 2t
1 + xt
]
= − 1
x
and we see that the corresponding investor is DARA if we take D(x) = γx−γ−1
for γ > 0. On the other hand,
sup
t≥0
∂2
∂x2 c(t, w(t, x))
∂
∂xc(t, w(t, x))
= lim
t→0
[
1
x
− 2t
1 + xt
]
=
1
x
.
so the choice D(x) = xe−ηx
2
for any η > 0, gives an IARA investor.
Another example arises by taking G(z) = 1 − e−z. In this case, we have
c(t, w) = wt + (1− wt)t−2 ln(1− wt), and
∂2
∂x2 c(t, w(t, x))
∂
∂xc(t, w(t, x))
=
1
x
− t.
As before, taking e.g. D(x) = xe−ηx
2
, gives an IARA investor. However there
is no choice of D(x) for which the investor will be DARA. Note that in this
example, since G is bounded by 1, the investor’s wealth will be below 1t at time
t, no matter how large their initial wealth.
2.5 Admissible utility functions
It is natural to ask if we can recover all utility functions u (up to addition of a
function A(t) +Bc) from the above setup? The answer is no.
Consider for example functions of the form: u(t, c) = U(c) for some increas-
ing concave function U(·). Such functions correspond to optimal paths which
are constant, but of course, these have infinite total consumption. Agents with
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finite initial wealth will try to spread the total consumption as evenly as possible
across the whole time horizon, but there will be no sensible ‘optimal’ consump-
tion. There may also be cases when optimal consumptions exist but are not
covered by our framework. For example, one may construct utility functions for
which optimal consumption paths are zero for a while and then leave zero to
follow a positive path.
Our aim in Section 2 was to consider the extent to which knowledge of opti-
mal consumption paths can be used to determine the utility in the deterministic
case. To obtain a complete and coherent description we worked under plausible,
but not necessary, assumptions e.g. that consumption levels are strictly increas-
ing in current wealth. The key discovery is that in the deterministic case there
is no way to compare utilities across different optimal consumption paths. We
shall see that this situation is rather special, and that the picture is different in
the stochastic case.
3 Stochastic Setting
We now turn to a more sophisticated version of the above problem, by consider-
ing what happens when we add the possibility of investment in a stochastic asset.
Specifically, we suppose there is a risky asset Pt, where Pt is a Black-Scholes
asset so that it has dynamics:
dPt
Pt
= σ(dBt + θ dt) + r dt. (14)
Here σ is the asset volatility, θ > 0 is the Sharpe ratio, and r is the interest rate,
which are all assumed to be constant, and Bt a standard Brownian motion. The
investor now has to choose a rate of consumption Ct and also an amount, Πt,
which is to be invested in the risky asset. Then her wealth at time t, Wt, is the
solution to:
dWt = rWtdt− Ctdt+ Πtσ(dBt + θdt), (15)
subject to W0 = x. Where we wish to highlight the dependence on initial wealth
x or strategy (C,Π) we may write this as W x,C,Πt .
The investor will specify an optimal pair of investment and consumption
strategies, Πt and Ct which attain the supremum in:
sup
Ct,Πt:W
C,Π
t ≥0
E
[∫ ∞
0
u(t, Ct) dt
]
(16)
subject to a budget constraint Wt ≥ 0 for all t ≥ 0. Here u is an unknown
function which we aim to find.
As usual, the above generalises to an optimal control problem, which has
value function:
v(t, w) = sup
Cs,Πs:W
C,Π
s ≥0
E
[∫ ∞
t
u(s, Cs) ds
∣∣Wt = w] .
Standard theory tells us that for a general pair (Ct,Πt) the process Mt =∫ t
0
u(s, Cs) ds+v(t,Wt) must be a supermartingale, and under the optimal strat-
egy will be a martingale. Applying Itoˆ’s Lemma to Mt, we see that the relevant
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drift (dt) terms are:
u(t, Ct) + vt(t,Wt) + vw(t,Wt) [rWt − Ct + Πtσθ] + 1
2
vww(t,Wt)σ
2Π2t . (17)
We assume that the optimal strategy takes the form (Ct = c(t,Wt),Πt =
pi(t,Wt)). Then, by analysing this equation, and considering possible solution
terms v(t, w), we prove in Theorem 3.4 that there is a function u(t, c) for which
the pair (c(t, w), pi(t, w)) is optimal if and only if these functions satisfy:
c(t, w)
pi(t, w)
− rw
pi(t, w)
+
σ2
2
piw(t, w) +
∫ w
·
pit(t, w˜)
pi(t, w˜)2
dw˜ = β(t) (18)
for some function β(t) — in particular, the left hand side is independent of w.
This consistency relationship between pi and c for them to be the solution of
an optimal consumption/investment problem of the type (16) was first derived
by Black (1968) (published later in a modified form as Black (1988)), then by
Cox and Leland (2000) and subsequently generalised and made rigorous by He
and Huang (1994), see Remark 3.8 below. Before stating and proving our main
result, Theorem 3.4, we give heuristic derivations of (18) using both primal and
dual approaches to (16).
3.1 Heuristics: the primal approach
To motivate the condition in (18), it turns out to be instructive to look at a
more general problem: we introduce a function Ψ(t, w) and then consider
v(t, w) = sup
Πs,Cs
E
[∫ ∞
t
(u(s, Cs) + Ψ(s,Ws)) ds
∣∣Wt = w] . (19)
As before our starting point is an assumption that the optimal strategy takes
the form (Ct = c(t,Wt),Πt = pi(t,Wt)). Then, by deriving an expression for Ψ
in terms of the functions pi(t, w), c(t, w), we will be able to recover the condition
(18) in the special case where Ψ is a function of time alone.
In the same way that we derived (17), we can get the martingale condition
corresponding to (19) which is
sup
C
[u(t, C)− vw(t,Wt)C] + sup
Π
[
Πσθvw(t,Wt) +
1
2
σ2Π2vww(t,Wt)
]
+ vt(t,Wt) + vw(t,Wt)rWt + Ψ(t,Wt) = 0. (20)
In particular, the optimal choice of Π, namely pi(t, w), should satisfy:
pi(t, w) = − θvw(t, w)
σvww(t, w)
, (21)
which in turn suggests we can write:
vw(t, w) = exp
{
A(t)−
∫ w
·
θ
σpi(t, w˜)
dw˜
}
, (22)
where A(t) is some function of t to be specified. Our aim is now to use this
expression to remove terms involving the function v from (20). To this end, it
will be easier to consider the derivative of (20).
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Suppose that u is concave and differentiable in c and introduce the convex
dual, u˜(t, ξ) = supχ (u(t, χ)− ξχ). Note that we have u˜ξ(t, ξ) = −χ∗, where χ∗
is the choice of χ which attains the supremum.
Substituting the optimal actions c(t, w) and pi(t, w) into (20), we get:
0 = u˜(t, vw(t, w)) +
1
2
pi(t, w)σθvw(t, w) + vt(t, w) + vw(t, w)rw + Ψ(t, w), (23)
and differentiating (23) with respect to w, we obtain:
0 = −vww(t, w)c(t, w)+1
2
pi(t, w)σθvww(t, w) +
1
2
σθvw(t, w)piw(t, w) + vtw(t, w)
+ vww(t, w)rw + vw(t, w)r + Ψw(t, w). (24)
If we now differentiate (22) in the time variable, we see that we must have:
vtw(t, w) =
[
A′(t) +
∫ w
·
θ
σpi(t, w˜)2
pit(t, w˜) dw˜
]
vw(t, w), (25)
so that (24) becomes:
0 =
[
1
2
pi(t, w)σθ + rw − c(t, w)
]
vww(t, w) + Ψw(t, w)
+
[
1
2
σθpiw(t, w) + r +A
′(t) +
∫ w
·
θ
σpi(t, w˜)2
pit(t, w˜) dw˜
]
vw(t, w).
Finally, dividing through by vw(t, w) we have:
−Ψw(t, w)
vw(t, w)
=
[
1
2
pi(t, w)σθ + rw − c(t, w)
]
vww(t, w)
vw(t, w)
+
1
2
σθpiw(t, w)
+ r +A′(t) +
∫ w
·
θ
σpi(t, w˜)2
pit(t, w˜) dw˜,
and using (21), we get:
Ψw(t, w) exp
{
−A(t) +
∫ w
·
θ
σpi(t, w˜)
dw˜
}
=
1
2
θ2 +
rwθ
σpi(t, w)
− θc(t, w)
pi(t, w)σ
− 1
2
σθpiw(t, w)− r −A′(t)
−
∫ w
·
θ
σpi(t, w˜)2
pit(t, w˜) dw˜. (26)
Since we have not yet fixed the constant of integration A(t), we are free to choose
this. Because our main interest is in the case where Ψ(t, w) is independent of w,
it follows that we are interested in cases where we can make the expression on
the right-hand side of (26) disappear, which will occur whenever the expression
θ2
2
+
rθw
σpi(t, w)
− θc(t, w)
σpi(t, w)
− σθ
2
piw(t, w)− r −
∫ w
1
θ
σpi(t, w˜)2
pit(t, w˜) dw˜
is independent of w. Differentiating once more in w, and rearranging, we see
that this is equivalent to pi, c satisfying:
pit(t, w) = −σ
2
2
pi(t, w)2piww(t, w)+(c(t, w)−rw)piw(t, w)−pi(t, w)cw(t, w)+rpi(t, w).
(27)
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This is Black’s equation (Black (1968, Equation (9)), see also Cox and Leland
(2000, Equation (47)) and He and Huang (1994, Equation (26))). Equivalently,
defining R(t, w) := c(t,w)pi(t,w) , we have that R solves:
Rw(t, w) =
r
pi(t, w)
− 1
pi(t, w)2
(pit(t, w) + rwpiw(t, w))− σ
2
2
piww(t, w), (28)
and integrating we arrive at Black’s PDE in integrated form (18)∫ w
1
pit(t, ξ)
(pi(t, ξ))2
dξ +
σ2
2
piw(t, w) +
c(t, w)
pi(t, w)
− r w
pi(t, w)
= β(t) (29)
for some function β(t), independent of w.
3.2 Heuristics: the dual approach
We now give a second derivation of Black’s equation using a dual approach to
the consumption/investment problem. We will use this approach to give our
main theorem below.
For the problem (16) we can rewrite the budget constraint as
E
[∫ ∞
0
CtZtdt
]
= x,
where (Zt)t≥0 is the state-price density process and is given by
Zt = exp
(
−rt− θBt − θ
2
2
t
)
.
With this formulation the problem becomes to find
sup
Ct
E
[∫ ∞
0
u(t, Ct)dt− λ
(∫ ∞
0
CtZtdt− x
)]
for an appropriate Lagrange multiplier λ = λ(x). This expression is bounded by
λx+E[
∫∞
0
u˜(t, λZt)dt] and for optimality we must have that uc(t, Ct) = λZt so
that writing I(t, ·) for the inverse in space of uc(t, ·) we deduce that the optimal
consumption takes the form Ct = I(t, λZt).
Now assume that the optimal strategy is a given function c = c(t, w) of
time and wealth so that Ct = c(t,Wt). It follows that Wt = f(t, λZt) for some
f = f(t, z) which depends on the (now unknown u) through f = c−1 ◦ I.
Then, by Itoˆ’s Lemma,
dWt = λfz(t, λZt)dZt + ft(t, λZt)dt+ (1/2)fzz(t, λZt)λ
2d〈Z〉t
= −θλZtfzdBt + {ft + (1/2)θ2λ2Z2fzz − rλZtfz}dt.
Comparing this with the wealth dynamics (15) we have
σpi(t, f(t, z)) = −θzfz(t, z), (30)
rf(t, z)− c(t, f(t, z)) + θσpi(t, f(t, z)) = ft(t, z) + (1/2)θ2z2fzz(t, z)− rzfz(t, z).
(31)
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Then σpiwfz = −θfz − θzfzz and σpit + σpiwft = −θzftz so that
θ2z2fzz = (θ + σpiw)σpi, (32)
ftz/fz = pit/pi + piwft/pi. (33)
Putting (32) into (31) gives
rf − c+ σθpi = σ
2
pi(θ + σpiw) + ft +
rσ
θ
pi. (34)
Differentiating with respect to z, dividing by fz = −σpi/(θz), using (33) and
(34) to eliminate ftz and ft and multiplying by pi we finally get
(r − cw(t, w))pi(t, w)− σ
2
2
(pi(t, w))2piww(t, w)− pit(t, w)
− rpiw(t, w)w + piw(t, w)c(t, w) = 0,
(35)
which is Black’s PDE (27).
Remark 3.1. Our motivation so far has been the following: we have supposed
that both the consumption and investment functions have been stated for all
times and wealths, and we have derived the consistency condition (29) as a
necessary condition that these functions must satisfy. However, the above cal-
culations also suggest an alternative way of viewing the setup. Suppose instead
our agent specifies her consumption (at all times and wealths), and her initial
investment strategies at all wealths (i.e. {pi(0, w)}w≥0). Then, under the as-
sumption that the agent is a utility maximiser, we can solve the parabolic PDE
(35) to deduce pi(t, w) at times t ≥ 0. Note that the utility function itself is
bypassed in the sense that we do not need to specify it to deduce pi(t, w). This
was one of the motivating observations for Black (1968).
3.3 Main results
Given a pair of processes (C,Π) ≡ (Cs,Πs)s≥0 define the associated wealth
process (W x,C,Πs )s≥0 for initial wealth x by
W x,C,Πs = x+
∫ s
0
Πuσ(dBu + θdu) +
∫ s
0
(rW x,C,Πu − Cu)du. (36)
We say that C,Π is admissible if (36) admits a strong solution W x,C,Πs with
W x,C,Πs ≥ 0 for all s and we write A = A(x) for the space of admissible strate-
gies. Note that if C,Π is admissible then, writing W for W x,C,Π,
d(ZsWs) = Zs(σΠs − θWs)dBs − ZsCsds. (37)
Hence (ZsWs)s≥0 is a non-negative supermartingale so that if Ws = 0 then, for
t ≥ s, E[WtZt|Fs] ≤ WsZs = 0 and hence Wt = 0 almost surely. Thus zero is
absorbing for any admissible strategy.
We suppose we are given functions c = c(t, w) and pi = pi(t, w) and we aim to
find, where possible, u such that Ct = c(t,W
x,C,Π
t ),Πt = pi(t,W
x,C,Π
t ) is optimal
for (16). We start by defining the class of utility functions we consider and
imposing further assumptions on our inputs. We focus here on the “regular” case
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which yields a clean simple statement of the main result. Possible extensions
which relax the assumptions on u, pi and c are discussed in Section 4.4.
Recall that a function φ(t, x) is locally Ho¨lder continuous on a set D if, for
every (t, x) ∈ D, there is some neighbourhood U of (t, x), and some α ∈ (0, 1]
such that
sup
(t′,x′),(t,x)∈U
|φ(t, x)− φ(t′, x′)|2
(|x− x′|2 + |t− t′|)α <∞.
Note that a function which is locally-Ho¨lder continuous is jointly continuous.
Definition 3.2. We say that a function u : [0,∞)2 → [−∞,∞) is a regular
utility function if for any t ≥ 0, u(t, ·) is twice continuously differentiable, strictly
concave and strictly increasing, and satisfies the Inada condition: uc(t, 0) =∞
and uc(t,∞) = 0. Further, I(t, ·) defined to be the inverse in space of uc (so
that uc(t, I(t, z)) = z) is such that Iz is locally Ho¨lder continuous on (0,∞)2.
If a utility function u is given we denote the set of admissible strategies
for which the reward in (16) is well defined by Au(x) = {(C,Π) ∈ A(x) :
E
∫∞
0
u(t, Ct)
+dt <∞ or E ∫∞
0
u(t, Ct)
−dt <∞}.
Definition 3.3. We say that (c, pi) is a regular consumption/investment pair if
• for each t ≥ 0, c(t, 0) = 0 and c(t, ·) is strictly increasing, unbounded and
differentiable with cw(t, w) locally Ho¨lder continuous on (0,∞)2.
• for each t ≥ 0, pi(t, 0) = 0, pi(t, ·) is strictly positive and ∫ 1
0
dξ/pi(t, ξ) =
∞ = ∫∞
1
dξ/pi(t, ξ). Further, pi = pi(t, w) is continuously differentiable in
both arguments on (0,∞)2.
Finally, c, pi are such that the SDE
dW xt = pi(t,W
x
t )σ(dBt + θdt) + (rW
x
t − c(t,W xt ))dt, W x0 = x, (38)
has a strong solution.
When we want to emphasize the dependence on c and pi we denote the
solution to (38) by W x = W x,c,pi.
Assuming that (c, pi) is a regular consumption/investment pair define Y (t, c)
to be the inverse to c(t, w) so that Y (t, c(t, w)) = w. Suppose further that c, pi
satisfy (29) and let A(t) = − θσ
∫ t
0
β(s)ds+ ( θ
2
2 − r)t, and define F (t, w) by
F (t, w) = eA(t) exp
{
− θ
σ
∫ w
1
dξ
pi(t, ξ)
}
. (39)
By assumption, for t > 0, F (t, 0) = ∞ and F (t,∞) = 0. For each t, F (t, w)
is C1,2 and decreasing in w, so we can define its inverse f = F−1 such that
f(t, F (t, w)) = w and F (t, f(t, z)) = z.
Finally set H(t, c) =
∫ c
1
F (t, Y (t, b))db. Note that we have
fz(t, z)Fw(t, f(t, z)) = 1; (40)
ft(t, z) + fz(t, z)Ft(t, f(t, z)) = 0; (41)
fz(t, z)Fww(t, f(t, z)) + fzz(t, z)Fw(t, f(t, z))
2 = 0, (42)
and that f is C1,2.
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Theorem 3.4. For any x > 0, the following two are equivalent:
(i) c(t,W xt ) and pi(t,W
x
t ) achieve a finite maximum in the problem
max
C,Π∈Au(x)
E
[∫ ∞
0
u(t, Ct)dt
]
, (43)
for a regular utility function u, as in Definition 3.2, for which
∃λ> 0 such that x = E
[∫ ∞
0
ZtI(t, λZt)dt
]
. (44)
(ii) c(t, w), pi(t, w) are a regular consumption/investment pair, as in Defini-
tion 3.3, c(t, w), pi(t, w) satisfy (29) on (0,∞)2 and
E
[∫ ∞
0
Ztc(t,W
x
t )dt
]
= x, (45)
and for some 0 < x0 ≤ x, E[|H(t, c(t,W x0t ))|] <∞ for almost all t ≥ 0 and∫∞
0
E[H(t, c(t,W x0t ))− h(t)]+dt <∞, where h(t) = E[H(t, c(t,W x0t ))].
Moreover, we then have uc(t, c) = Hc(t, c), Au(x) = A(x) and in (i) one may
take u(t, c) = H(t, c)− h(t).
Remark 3.5. In (ii) it is equivalent to use f(t, F (0, x)Zt) in place of W
x
t
throughout. This condition may be easier to check.
Remark 3.6. It is interesting to observe the analogy with the deterministic
setup considered in Section 2. There, given an agent’s consumption, we recov-
ered their utility function as uc(t, c) = F˜ (t, y(t, c)), where y(t, c) was the inverse
of consumption and F˜ (x) =
∫∞
x
D(s)ds was an arbitrary absolutely continuous
decreasing non-negative function. In Theorem 3.4 above, we recover the utility
function in the same form uc(t, c) = F (t, Y (t, c)) but now F is uniquely specified
in terms of the agent’s investment strategy coupled with the discounting term
A(t) read off from Black’s equation (29).
Remark 3.7. There are close parallels between different conditions in (i) and
(ii):
• The fundamental point of the theorem is the equivalence between (29)
and optimality of c, pi for the problem (43). If (29) fails, c, pi may still be
optimal but for a more general problem of the type (19).
• The integrability conditions on pi(t, w): ∫ 1
0
dξ/pi(t, ξ) =∞ = ∫∞
1
dξ/pi(t, ξ)
correspond to the Inada condition on u.
• Equations (44) and (45) are essentially the same and encode the budget
constraint. We show below that if E[
∫∞
0
Ztc(t,W
x
t )dt] > x then (C,Π) is
not admissible. Conversely, if E[
∫∞
0
Ztc(t,W
x
t )dt] = x − δ for δ > 0 then
c, pi is typically not optimal. Indeed, if c˜(t, w) = c(t, w)+δe−s/Zs then (by
Theorem III.9.4 of Karatzas and Shreve (1998)) there exists a process Π˜
such that c˜, Π˜ is admissible, and achieves a strictly higher expected utility
of consumption over time in (43).
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In general the assumptions of Theorem 3.4 may be non-trivial to verify. However
we provide a wide class of examples where they hold, see Lemma 4.3 below. In
Section 4.4, we shall also discuss some ways in which the conditions of the
theorem may be relaxed.
Remark 3.8. The focus in Cox and Leland (2000) and He and Huang (1994)
is on a problem in which (43) is replaced by maximisation of expected utility
of consumption and terminal wealth over a finite horizon [0, T ]. These papers
give analogues of Theorem 3.4 above in this setting ((Cox and Leland, 2000,
Proposition 3), (He and Huang, 1994, Theorems 1&3)). Cox and Leland (2000)
develop discrete-time arguments, and pass to the limit without full justification
to deduce the continuous-time result. He and Huang (1994) work directly in
continuous time, and give a rigorous derivation of the results.
In many respects the infinite horizon problem is more natural than the finite
horizon version, but it introduces new difficulties related in particular to the
budget constraint (44)–(45) and finiteness of the value function (43). He and
Huang (1994) comment that their analysis could extend to an infinite horizon
with the additional condition E[ZtWt] → 0 as t → ∞ which, under all their
assumptions, implies our budget constraint (45). However this does not seem
to be so immediate due to the important integrability restrictions on c in He
and Huang (1994). Further, the well-posedness and finiteness of the expected
utility is not discussed.
In addition to the finite horizon/infinite horizon distinction, we believe our
approach has the advantage of a mathematically rigorous and unified if and
only if statement with a straightforward proof which should be appealing to a
contemporary reader. Our proof of Theorem 3.4 is based on the dual approach.
In contrast (He and Huang, 1994, Theorem 1) use a primal approach to prove
results for the forward problem ((i) implies (ii) in our theorem), and a dual
approach for the inverse problem (He and Huang, 1994, Theorem 3). The mixing
of primal and dual techniques can easily lead to incompatibilities between sets
of assumptions, and for this reason He and Huang (1994) do not have an if and
only if statement. For example, the assumptions of Theorem 3 in He and Huang
(1994) are easily satisfied by consumption and investment strategies which are
proportional to wealth and which result from CRRA utility, see Example 3.9
below. However, taking parameters which correspond to risk aversion γ > 1
means that the value function behaves as 11−γx
1−γ and does not satisfy the
polynomial growth restriction required for their Theorem 1. The authors seemed
to have been aware of such instances, see Footnote 20 therein.
We note also that we are able to make less restrictive assumptions than
previous works. In particular, both Cox and Leland (2000) and He and Huang
(1994) assumed stronger growth and differentiability properties on c and pi. Fur-
ther, these properties were imposed as standing assumptions for their theorems
whereas in one direction we deduce these properties from the regularity of u.
Moreover, our setup allows us to obtain a general class of actions for which we
can verify the assumptions, see Lemma 4.3 below, which includes interesting
examples. This seems very difficult in the set-up of He and Huang (1994).
Nevertheless, we stress that He and Huang (1994) remains a very impressive
paper, with many contributions which are beyond the scope of this work. In
particular, they considered a more general setup than we do in that they allowed
the stock price Pt to be a generic diffusion (local volatility) process and c and
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pi to depend on the state (i.e. Pt) as well.
Proof of Theorem 3.4. We first show that (ii)⇒ (i).
We take u(t, c) = H(t, c)−h(t) which is strictly increasing and strictly concave.
We have uc(t, 0) = F (t, Y (t, 0)) = F (t, 0) = ∞, uc(t,∞) = F (t, Y (t,∞)) =
F (t,∞) = 0 and ucc(t, l) = Fw(t, Y (t, l))/cw(t, Y (t, l)) is continuous on (0,∞).
In addition, I(t, z) = c(t, f(t, z)) and, as observed above, f is well defined and
C1,2 on (0,∞)2. In consequence, Iz(t, z) is locally Ho¨lder continuous and u is a
regular utility function of Definition 3.2.
Let λ = λ(x) = F (0, x) and setWt = f(t, λ(x)Zt), so thatW0 = f(0, λ(x)) =
x = W x,pi,c0 . We now show that Wt = W
x,pi,c
t .
Note that by construction we have uc(s, c(s,Ws)) = F (s,Ws) = λ(x)Zs. By
Itoˆ’s Lemma
dWt =λ(x)fz(t, λ(x)Zt)dZt + ft(t, λ(x)Zt)dt+
λ(x)2
2
fzz(t, λZt)d〈Z〉t
=− θλ(x)Ztfz(t, λ(x)Zt)dBt
+
(
ft(t, λ(x)Zt)− rλ(x)Ztfz(t, λ(x)Zt) + θ
2λ(x)2
2
Z2t fzz(t, λ(x)Zt)
)
dt.
Then Wt is a strong solution to (38) provided that for w = f(t, z),
−θzfz(t, z) = σpi(t, w)
and
θσpi(t, w) + rw − c(t, w) = ft(t, z)− rzfz(t, z) + 1
2
θ2z2fzz(t, z).
For the first of these, using z = F (t, w) and the definition of F and (40), we
have
−θzfz(t, z) = −θ F (t, w)
Fw(t, w)
= σpi(t, w).
For the second, using also (41) and (42),
ft(t, z)− rzfz(t, z) + 1
2
θ2z2fzz(t, z)
= −fz(t, z)
(
Ft(t, w) + rF (t, w) +
θ2
2
F (t, w)2Fww(t, w)
Fw(t, w)2
)
=
−F (t, w)
Fw(t, w)
(
A′(t) +
θ
σ
∫ w
1
pit(t, ξ)
(pi(t, ξ))2
dξ + r +
1
2
[
θ2 + σθpiw(t, w)
])
(46)
=
σpi(t, w)
θ
(
θ2 +
θrw
σpi(t, w)
− θc(t, w)
σpi(t, w)
)
= rw + θσpi(t, w)− c(t, w). (47)
We thus conclude that W xt and Wt are strong solutions to the same SDE, (38).
By Karatzas and Shreve (1991, Theorem 5.2.5), we therefore have W xt = Wt =
f(t, λ(x)Zt) for all t ≥ 0 a.s. with λ(x) = F (0, x).
For the rest of the proof, with slight abuse of notational conventions, let us
write cxt := c(t,W
x
t ). It follows that c
x
t = c(t, f(t, F (0, x)Zt)) a.s. and in partic-
ular cxs ≤ cys for 0 < x < y. Further, since uc(t, c(t, f(t, z))) = F (t, f(t, z)) = z,
we have uc(t, c
x
t ) = λ(x)Zt, so that c
x
t = I(t, λ(x)Zt) and
u˜(t, λ(x)Zt) = u(t, c
x
t )− λ(x)Ztcxt , (48)
19
where u˜ is the convex dual of u. It follows that (44) is simply (45).
By the assumption E[|u(t, c(t,W x0t ))|] ≤ E[|H(t, c(t,W x0t ))|] + |h(t)| < ∞
and
E[u(t, c(t,W x0t ))] = E[H(t, c(t,W
x0
t ))]− h(t) = 0.
Using the hypothesis E[
∫∞
0
[u(t, c(t,W x0t ))]
+dt] <∞ we obtain
E[
∫ ∞
0
u(t, c(t,W x0t ))dt] = 0.
For x > x0 we write
u(t, cxt ) ≤ u˜(t, λ(x0)Zt) + λ(x0)Ztcxt = u(t, cx0t ) + λ(x0)(cxt − cx0t )Zt
and hence
E
∫ ∞
0
u(t, cxt )
+dt ≤ E
∫ ∞
0
u(t, cx0t )
+dt+ λ(x0)E
∫ ∞
0
Ztc
x
t dt <∞.
Hence E[
∫∞
0
u(t, cxt )dt] is well defined and non-negative.
Consider now arbitrary C,Π ∈ A(x). From (37) we have
0 ≤WtZt = x+
∫ t
0
Zs(σΠs − θWs)dBs −
∫ t
0
ZsCsds.
It follows that
0 ≤
∫ t
0
ZsCsds ≤ x+
∫ t
0
Zs(σΠs − θWs)dBs.
In particular
∫ t
0
Zs(Πs − θWs)dBs ≥ −x is bounded below and hence is a su-
permartingale. We also conclude that for each t, E[
∫ t
0
ZsCsds] ≤ x and hence
E
[∫ ∞
0
ZsCsds
]
≤ x. (49)
It follows that, with λ = λ(x),
E
[∫ ∞
0
u(s, Cs)
+ds
]
≤ xλ+ E
[∫ ∞
0
(u(s, Cs)− λZsCs)+ds
]
≤ xλ+ E
[∫ ∞
0
u˜(s, λZs)
+ds
]
= xλ+ E
[∫ ∞
0
(u(s, cxs )− λZscxs )+ds
]
≤ xλ+ E
[∫ ∞
0
u(s, cxs )
+ds
]
<∞,
where we used (48). In consequence, A(x) = Au(x). Once we know the expec-
tations exist we proceed with a standard argument:
E
[∫ ∞
0
u(s, Cs)ds
]
≤ λx+ E
[∫ ∞
0
u(s, Cs)− λZsCsds
]
≤ λx+ E
[∫ ∞
0
u˜(s, λZs)ds
]
.
(50)
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Further, from (45) and (48) it is immediate that there is equality throughout
(50) for Cs = c
x
s and Πs = pi(s,W
x
s ) which shows that these are optimal.
We come now to the other implication: (i)⇒ (ii).
Take λ as in (44) and let Cs := I(s, λZs). In particular, u˜(s, λZs) = u(s, Cs)−
λZsCs ≥ u(s, cxs )− λZscxs and hence
u(s, cxs )
− ≥ (λZs(cxs − Cs) + u(s, Cs))− ≥ u(s, Cs)− − λZs(cxs − Cs)+.
Rearranging and integrating we have
E
[∫ ∞
0
u(s, Cs)
−ds
]
≤ E
[∫ ∞
0
u(s, cxs )
−ds
]
+ λE
[∫ ∞
0
Zs(c
x
s + Cs)ds
]
<∞,
where we used (49) and the fact that cxs induces a finite maximum in (43). As
observed earlier (cf. Theorem III.9.4 in Karatzas and Shreve (1998)), there exists
(Πs) such that (Cs,Πs) ∈ A(x) and the above then shows that (Cs,Πs) ∈ Au(x).
Proceeding as in (50), we obtain
E
[∫ ∞
0
u(s, cxs )ds
]
≤ λx+ E
[∫ ∞
0
u˜(s, λZs)ds
]
= E
[∫ ∞
0
u(s, Cs)ds
]
.
It follows we have to have equality in the above equation which is true if and
only if u(s, cxs ) − λZscxs = u˜(s, λZs) ds × dP-a.e., which in turn is true if and
only if cxs = Cs almost surely. In consequence, (45) is simply (44).
Using similar arguments to the ones which led to (49) above we see that
WtZt →W∞Z∞ a.s. as t→∞. Further
0 ≤ EW∞Z∞ ≤ x− E
∫ ∞
0
ZsCsds = 0
and hence W∞Z∞ ≡ 0. In addition, by considering a localising sequence of
stopping times τN , from (37) we get:
x = E [WτNZτN ] + E
[∫ τN
0
CsZsds
]
.
But from (44) x = E
∫∞
0
ZsCsds, so E [WτNZτN ]→ 0 as N →∞. Moreover,
WtZt = E
[∫ τN
t
CsZsds
∣∣∣Ft]+ E [WτNZτN ∣∣Ft] ,
and the final term is almost surely non-negative. So
WtZt − E
[∫ ∞
t
CsZsds
∣∣∣Ft] ≥ 0
almost surely, and taking expectations, we see that this has expected value
limN→∞ E [WτNZτN ] = 0. Hence
Wt =
1
Zt
E
[∫ ∞
t
CsZsds
∣∣∣Ft] = 1
Zt
E
[∫ ∞
t
I(s, λZs)Zsds
∣∣∣Ft] .
Define g(t, z) to be the solution to the PDE
gt + z(θ
2 − r)gz + 1
2
z2θ2gzz − rg = −I(t, λz)
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with initial condition g(0, z) = E
[∫∞
0
I(s, λZs)Zsds
∣∣Z0 = z]. It follows that g ∈
C1,2, and in fact (e.g. Friedman (1964, Theorem 3.5.10)) since Iz is locally Ho¨lder
continuous, that gtz exists and is also locally Ho¨lder continuous. Applying Itoˆ’s
Lemma, and using a similar localisation and convergence argument as above,
we deduce that
g(t, Zt) =
1
Zt
E
[∫ ∞
t
I(s, λZs)Zsds|Ft
]
.
We conclude that Wt = g(t, Zt) and since I is strictly decreasing on (0,∞)
in Zt, and noting that Zs/Zt is independent of Zt, then g(t, ·) is also strictly
decreasing. Additionally, g is strictly positive and both g(t, z) and zgz(t, z)
tend to zero as z tends to infinity, and g(t, z) tends to infinity as x tends to
0. We have c(t, w) = I(t, λg−1(t, w)), and we conclude that c(t, 0) = 0, c(t, ·)
is strictly increasing, unbounded and cw(t, w) is locally Ho¨lder continuous on
(0,∞)2. Finally, we deduce that g = Y ◦ I.
Using Itoˆ’s Lemma and equating dWt with the wealth dynamics in (38) we
obtain (30)–(31), with g instead of f , which hold for all t, z > 0. It follows that
pi(t, 0) = 0, and pi(t, w) > 0 for w > 0. From (30), and (as noted above) since
gtz exists, we get the required differentiability properties of pi. We then proceed
as in (32)–(35), to conclude that (29) holds.
This means F in (39) is well defined and we may consider W˜t = f(t, F (0, x)Zt),
with f = F−1 as above. Proceeding as in the first part of the proof it follows
that W˜t is a strong solution to the SDE (38) considered for 0 ≤ t < τ , where
τ = inf{s : Zs /∈ (F (s,∞)/F (0, x), F (s, 0)/F (0, x))} = inf{s : W˜s ∈ {0,∞}}.
Unicity of strong solution to an SDE, as invoked above, holds also when we
consider the SDE not on t ∈ (0,∞) but on [0, τ), and we conclude that W˜t =
W xt = g(t, λZt). However since we know that 0 < W
x
t < ∞ a.s. it follows that
τ = ∞; i.e. F (t, 0) = ∞ and F (t,∞) = 0. Finally, from cxt = I(t, λZt) and
W xt = W˜t, it also follows that uc(t, c) = Hc(t, c) so that u(t, c) = H(t, c)− ζ(t),
for some function ζ. As cxt achieves a finite maximum in (43) it follows that
E[|H(t, c(t,W xt ))|] < ∞ for a.e. t ≥ 0 and Fubini’s theorem yields
∫∞
0
(h(t) −
ζ(t))dt is well defined and finite when we take h(t) = E[H(t, c(t,W xt ))]. In
consequence,
E
∫ ∞
0
[H(t, c(t,W xt ))− h(t)]+dt < E
∫ ∞
0
[H(t, c(t,W xt ))− ζ(t)]+dt
+
∫ ∞
0
(ζ(t)− h(t))+dt <∞.
(51)
Hence (ii) holds when we take x = x0. It follows from the first part of the proof
that we may take u(t, c) = H(t, c)− h(t).
3.4 Example with c, pi linear in wealth
Example 3.9. Suppose c(t, w) = κw and pi(t, w) = φw for κ, φ > 0 with
φ 6= θ/σ. Then Black’s equation (29) is satisfied, Y (t, b) = b/κ, β(t) ≡ β =
(κ− r)/φ+ σ2φ/2 and A(t) = ξt where ξ = −θβ/σ + θ2/2− r.
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Let γ = θ/φσ. We have F (t, w) = eξtw−γ and in particular F (t, 0) = ∞,
F (t,∞) = 0. It follows that λ(x) = x−γ and f(t, z) = z−1/γe(ξ/γ)t, which is
C1,2 differentiable.
Further, W xt = f(t, λ(x)Zt) = xe
φσBt+(σφθ+r−κ−σ2φ2/2)t and a direct com-
putation yields
eξtE[(W xt )1−γ ] = x1−γeξt/γE[Z
1−1/γ
t ] = x
1−γe−κt. (52)
It follows that
E
[∫ ∞
0
Ztc(t,W
x
t )dt
]
= κxE
[∫ ∞
0
(Zt)
1−1/γeξt/γdt
]
= κx
∫ ∞
0
e−κtdt = x.
Also H(t, c) = 11−γ e
ξtκγ [c1−γ − 1] so that, taking x0 = 1,
h(t) = E[H(t, c(t,W x0t ))] =
1
1− γ
(
κe−κt − eξtκγ) ,
and
u(t, c) =
1
1− γ
(
κγeξtc1−γ − κe−κt)
=
κγeξt
1− γ
(
c1−γ − (κe−ζt)1−γ) , (53)
where ζ = (ξ+κ)/(1− γ) = κ− r− θ22γ . Then, using (52), E[u(t, c(t,W x0t ))+] <
De−κt for some constant D, and hence
∫∞
0
E[H(t, Ct) − h(t)]+dt < ∞ for the
optimal policy.
In the above we could take any x0 > 0. So, in conclusion, for any initial cap-
ital x > 0, pi, c solve the optimal consumption problem for admissible strategies
for u as given in (53). We note that the choice of consumption and invest-
ment which are linear in wealth and time-homogeneous necessarily implies an
exponential discounting of utility from a given wealth.
4 Consequences and Extensions of the Main Re-
sult
4.1 Model uncertainty
In our analysis so far we assumed agents believe that the price process follows the
Black-Scholes model (14) with given parameters θ, σ. We then asked whether
their observed actions are optimal for (43) for some utility function u. Suppose
however that we do not know agents’ beliefs about model parameters. We may
then ask more generally whether agents’ actions are optimal for some utility
function u and some price dynamics?2
More precisely, within the realm of Theorem 3.4, we can ask the following:
are the observed actions optimal for (43) for some u and some θ, σ? Assume
we are not in the special case when piw(t, w) = φ(t). Then pi and c must solve
2We are grateful to Masaaki Fukasawa for suggesting this question. See also Cuoco and
Zapatero (2000) for related results, although with an emphasis on equilibrium constraints.
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Black’s PDE (29) and clearly there can be at most one value of σ for which
(29) is satisfied. Put differently, if we find that agents are optimising expected
utility of consumption then we also recover uniquely their belief about market’s
volatility. In contrast we do not recover their belief about the Sharpe ratio θ,
which does not appear in (29). Indeed, as we argue below, if c, pi are consistent
with utility maximisation for a model with Sharpe ratio θ, then we expect that
they are also consistent with utility maximisation for a model with a different
Sharpe ratio θˆ, but for a different utility.
Consider Pˆ, Zˆt defined via
dPˆ
dP
∣∣∣
Ft
= exp
(
(θˆ − θ)Bt − (θˆ − θ)
2
2
t
)
=
Zt
Zˆt
so that
dPt
Pt
= σ(dBˆt + θˆdt) + rdt,
for a Pˆ–Brownian motion Bˆt = Bt−(θˆ−θ)t. Observe further that Zt = Zˆθ/θˆt eµt,
with µ = θ2 (θ − θˆ) + r( θθˆ − 1).
Suppose agents’ actions pi, c are given and the equivalent conditions in The-
orem 3.4 hold. Define a new utility function uˆ(t, c) via the inverse of uˆc:
Iˆ(t, z) := I(t, zθ/θˆeµt). It follows that the budget equation (44) holds for
λˆ = λθˆ/θ. Indeed, by definition,
Eˆ
[∫ ∞
0
ZˆtIˆ(t, λˆZˆt)dt
]
= Eˆ
[∫ ∞
0
ZˆtI(t, λZt)dt
]
= E
[∫ ∞
0
ZtI(t, λZt)dt
]
= x.
Classical duality arguments (see the proof of the implication (i)⇒ (ii) in The-
orem 3.4 above), yield that the optimal consumption policy in the problem (43)
for uˆ under Pˆ is given as
Ct = Iˆ(t, λˆZˆt) = I(t, λZt) = c(t,W
x
t ).
Provided (43) for uˆ under Pˆ has a finite value, we conclude that the agents’
chosen actions are optimal for u under P and for uˆ under Pˆ.
We will not persue this finiteness issue here. However, Lemma 4.3 below
gives sufficient conditions under which the problem value is finite, and then we
conclude that the same consumption/investment pair is consistent with a family
of utility functions, each member of which corresponds to a different model and
Sharpe ratio.
4.2 Risk aversion
We now return to our original setting where σ, θ are known and fixed and we
consider questions similar to those which arose in Theorem 2.6, namely, we
investigate what we can say about an investor’s risk profile from her actions.
Recall the absolute risk aversion ρ(t, c) given in Definition 2.5.
Proposition 4.1. An investor with investment and consumption strategies pi(t, w),
c(t, w) satisfying the assumptions of (ii) of Theorem 3.4, where c(t, w) is twice
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continuously differentiable in wealth, has decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA)
if and only if
piw(t, w)
pi(t, w)
≥ −cww(t, w)
cw(t, w)
. (54)
In particular, a sufficient condition for an investor to be DARA is convexity (in
wealth) of her consumption and investment which is increasing in wealth.
Proof. From the final statement of Theorem 3.4, the investor’s utility function
u satisfies uc(t, c) = Hc(t, c) = F (t, Y (t, c)) and from (39) it follows that
ρ(t, c) =
θ
σpi(t, Y (t, c))
Yc(t, c).
The absolute risk aversion is decreasing, i.e. ρc(t, c) ≤ 0 iff:
0 ≥ ∂
∂c
[
Yc(t, c)
pi(t, Y (t, c))
]
⇐⇒ 0 ≥ Ycc(t, c)
pi(t, Y (t, c))
− (Yc(t, c))
2
piw(t, Y (t, c))
pi(t, Y (t, c))2
⇐⇒ 0 ≥− cww(t, w)
pi(t, w)cw(t, w)3
− piw(t, w)
cw(t, w)2pi(t, w)2
∣∣∣∣
w=Y (t,c)
⇐⇒ 0 ≤ piw(t, w) + pi(t, w)cww(t, w)
cw(t, w)
∣∣∣∣
w=Y (t,c)
.
Transforming the last inequality we arrive at the statement of the proposition.
In a similar manner we derive a condition equivalent to relative risk aversion.
We omit the proof for the sake of brevity.
Proposition 4.2. An investor with investment and consumption strategies pi(t, w)
and c(t, w) satisfying the assumptions of (ii) of Theorem 3.4, where c(t, w) is
twice continuously differentiable in wealth, has decreasing relative risk aversion
(DRRA) if and only if
(cw(t, w))
2 − c(t, w)cww(t,w) ≤ cw(t, w)c(t, w)piw(t, w)
pi(t, w)
or equivalently iff
∂
∂w
[
log
c(t, w)
cw(t, w)
]
≤ ∂
∂w
log pi(t, w).
4.3 Time-homogeneous investment and consumption
We specialise now to the important special case of pi(t, w), c(t, w) which are
independent of time. Suppose first that pi(t, w) = pi(w) is independent of time.
Equation (28) then simplifies to
Rw(t, w) =
r
pi(w)
− rw
pi(w)2
piw(w)− σ
2
2
piww(w) =
∂
∂w
(
rw
pi(w)
− σ
2
2
piw(w)
)
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which yields
R(t, w) =
rw
pi(w)
− σ
2
2
piw(w) + β(t),
where β(t) is taken such that R(t, w) > 0. In consequence
c(t, w) = R(t, w)pi(w) = rw − σ
2
2
pi(w)piw(w) + β(t)pi(w) . (55)
In particular, if the agent invests a constant proportion of wealth in the risky
asset, i.e. pi(w) = φw, φ > 0, then
c(t, w) =
(
r − σ
2
2
φ2 + β(t)φ
)
w = R(t, 1)φw
is also linear in wealth. It is straightforward to see that for a reasonable β(t)
(e.g. continuous and bounded) agent’s choices c and pi verify the assumptions
of Theorem 3.4. The case β(t) ≡ β, a constant, was worked out explicitly in
Example 3.9 above.
We want to study in more detail the implications of representation (55) on
the possible behaviour of admissible investment/consumption strategies. As-
sume that c = c(w) is also time-homogenous, or equivalently that β(t) ≡ β is
a constant. Recall that we require pi(0) = c(0) = 0 and both pi(w), c(w) are
non-negative and c(w) is increasing. Consider an investment strategy given by
pi(w) = φwα with α > 0. Then (55) gives
c(w) = rw − σ
2φ2α
2
w2α−1 + βφwα. (56)
The condition c(0) = 0 restricts us to α > 1/2. Considering α ∈ (0.5, 1) we
see that the middle term in (56) dominates for small w so that cw(0+) = −∞
and c(w) is negative for small values of w. On the other hand, if α > 1 then
the middle term dominates for large values of w and c(w) becomes negative
then. We conclude that the only admissible value is the one studied above:
α = 1. This indicates that an admissible investment strategy has to have linear
behaviour near zero and infinity. For such actions we are able to verify the
assumptions in Theorem 3.4.
Lemma 4.3. Suppose c(t, 0) = 0 = pi(t, 0), pi(t, w) = pi(w) is time homoge-
neous, c(t, w) is continuous and c, pi are continuously differentiable in w and cw
is locally Ho¨lder continuous on (0,∞)2. Further, c and pi satisfy (29) and there
exist strictly positive constants δ˜1, δ˜2, κ1, κ2 with
piw(w) −−−−→
w→∞ δ˜1, piw(w) −−−→w→0 δ˜2,
δ1 := δ˜1 ∧ δ˜2 ≤ piw(w) ≤ δ˜1 ∨ δ˜2 =: δ2, and κ1 ≤ cw(t, w) ≤ κ2, t ≥ 0, w ≥ 0.
(57)
Finally, assume either that θ/σ ≤ δ1, or δ1 < θ/σ ≤ δ2 and (θ(1−δ2/δ1)+σδ2) >
0. 3
3We are grateful to Li Yu for noticing an error in an earlier version of this paper, in which
we incorrectly stated a slightly different set of conditions.
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Then c, pi is a regular investment/consumption pair (Definition 3.3) and, for
any x > 0, E[|H(t, c(t,W xt ))|] < ∞ and
∫∞
0
E[H(t, c(t,W xt )) − h(t)]+dt < ∞.
Further, F (t, 0) =∞, F (t,∞) = 0, for all t ≥ 0, and (45) holds for any x > 0.
In consequence, (i) and (ii) in Theorem 3.4 hold true.
Proof. It is immediate that
∫ 1
0
dξ/pi(ξ) =
∫∞
1
dξ/pi(ξ) =∞ and hence F (t, 0) =
∞ and F (t,∞) = 0. The other properties of Definition 3.3 follow equally easily.
Fix x > 0 for the rest of the proof. Equation (57) implies global Lipschitz
behaviour of c, pi which guarantees the existence of a strong unique solution to
(38). Let Q be the risk neutral measure under which Bθt := Bt+θt is a Brownian
motion and put W˜t := e
−rtWt. We then have
W˜t = x+ σMt −
∫ t
0
e−rsc(s,Ws)ds, (58)
where Mt :=
∫ t
0
e−rspi(Ws)dBθs is a Q-local martingale. In particular, W˜t is a
non-negative super-martingale under Q and hence converges, Q-a.s. as t→∞.
It follows that Mt also converges Q-a.s. which is equivalent to 〈M〉t converging
(cf. (Revuz and Yor, 2001, Proposition V.1.8)). However∫ t
0
δ21W˜
2
s ds ≤ 〈M〉t =
∫ t
0
e−2rspi(Ws)2ds ≤
∫ t
0
δ22W˜
2
s ds
and it follows that W˜t → 0 Q-a.s. Finally, from classical estimates (e.g. (Fried-
man, 1975, Theorem 5.2.3)), we have that EQ[(W˜t)m] < ∞ for all m ≥ 1. It
follows that EQ[〈M〉t] <∞ and hence Mt is a Q-martingale with EQMt = 0. In
particular
E
∫ ∞
0
Zsc(s,Ws)ds = lim
t→∞E
Q
∫ t
0
e−rsc(s,Ws)ds = x− lim
t→∞E
Q[W˜t].
To show (45), it remains to argue that limt→∞ EQ[W˜t] = 0. It follows from the
above representation that EQ[W˜t] is decreasing in t. By (58), and EQMt = 0,
we have:
EQW˜t = x− EQ
∫ t
0
e−rsc(s, ersW˜s)ds.
Using the fact that c(s, w) ≥ κ1w, and applying Fubini’s theorem, we get:
EQW˜t ≤ x− κ1
∫ t
0
EQW˜s ds.
The desired conclusion follows immediately. It remains to show the integrability
properties of H. We will show the stronger fact that E|H(t, c(t,Wt))| < ∞ for
all t, and also that E
∫∞
0
|H(t, c(t,Wt))|dt < ∞. From (57) we get instantly
that
w−
θ
σδ2 ≤ e−A(t)F (t, w) ≤ w− θσδ1 , 0 ≤ w < 1
w−
θ
σδ1 ≤ e−A(t)F (t, w) ≤ w− θσδ2 , w ≥ 1
(59)
from which it follows that
eA(t)
σδ1
θ z−
σδ1
θ ≤ f(t, z) ≤ eA(t)σδ2θ z−σδ2θ , 0 ≤ z < eA(t)
eA(t)
σδ2
θ z−
σδ2
θ ≤ f(t, z) ≤ eA(t)σδ1θ z−σδ1θ , z ≥ eA(t) .
(60)
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The integrability properties we need to establish are invariant under a shift of
H by a constant so we are free to redefine H as
H(t, z) :=
∫ z
c(t,1)
F (t, Y (t, b))db, so that H(t, c(t, w)) =
∫ w
1
F (t, s)cw(t, s)ds.
In consequence
H(t, c(t, w))+ =
∫ w∨1
1
F (t, s)cw(t, s)ds ≤ κ2eA(t)
∫ w∨1
1
s−
θ
σδ2 ds (61)
and similarly
H(t, c(t, w))− =
∫ 1
w∧1
F (t, s)cw(t, s)ds ≤ κ2eA(t)
∫ 1
w∧1
s−
θ
σδ1 ds (62)
Suppose first that θ < σδ2. Then H(t, c(t, w))
+ ≤ eA(t) σδ2κ2σδ2−θw
1− θσδ2 1{w≥1}.
Using Wt = f(t, λ(x)Zt) and the estimates in (60), we have
EH(t, c(t,Wt))+ ≤ eA(t) σδ2κ2
σδ2 − θE
[
f(t, λ(x)Zt)
1− θσδ2 1λ(x)Zt≤eA(t)
]
≤ σδ2κ2
σδ2 − θ e
A(t)
σδ2
θ E[(λ(x)Zt)1−
σδ2
θ ]
(63)
and it follows that EH(t, c(t,Wt))+ <∞.
To estimate the expectation of the integral in time we need a more careful
analysis. From Black’s equation (29), given that pi is time-homogeneous, we
know that
β(t) =
σ2
2
piw(w)− r w
pi(w)
+
c(t, w)
pi(w)
, (64)
is a function of t only. Now, depending on whether δ2 = δ˜2 or δ2 = δ˜1, we let
w → 0 or w →∞ on the RHS. The first term in (64) then converges to σ2δ2/2,
the second term converges by l’Hoˆpital’s rule to r/δ2 and hence also the third
term converges to some κ3(t)/δ2, where κ3(t) ≥ κ1 > 0. We conclude that
β(t) = σ2δ2/2 + κ3(t)/δ2 − r/δ2 and
A(t) = − θ
σ
∫ t
0
β(s)ds+
(
θ2
2
− r
)
t
≤
(
− θ
σ
(σ2δ2/2 + κ1/δ2 − r/δ2) + θ
2
2
− r
)
t
=
(
−θκ1
σδ2
−
(
1− θ
σδ2
)(
θσδ2
2
+ r
))
t. (65)
Using this last estimate in (63) we recover the situation in (52). Since by assump-
tion θ < σδ2, and using the representation Zt = e
−rt−θBt−θ2t/2 in (63) we have
EH(t, c(t,Wt))+ ≤ Ce−κ1t for a constant C, and hence E
∫∞
0
H(t, c(t,Wt))
+dt <
∞.
We now turn to the estimates of H(t, c(t,Wt))
−. In the case where θ < σδ1,
(62) implies that H(t, c(t, w))− ≤ κ2eA(t) σδ1σδ1−θ (1 − (w ∧ 1)1−θ/σδ1). Hence
EH(t, c(t,Wt))− < ∞, giving also E|H(t, c(t,Wt))| < ∞, and for some con-
stant C, E
∫∞
0
H(t, c(t,Wt))
−dt ≤ C ∫∞
0
eA(t) dt. Since (65) implies A(t)/t < 0
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is bounded away from zero by a constant, then the integral is finite, and so∫∞
0
|H(t, c(t,Wt))|dt <∞. In the case where δ1 < θ/σ < δ2 and (θ(1−δ2/δ1)+
σδ2) > 0, (62) implies H(t, c(t, w))
− ≤ eA(t) σδ1κ2θ−σδ1w
1− θσδ1 1{w≤1}, and this is
decreasing as a function of w. Using (60), we get
EH(t, c(t,Wt))− ≤ eA(t) σδ1κ2
θ − σδ1E
[
f(t, λ(x)Zt)
1− θσδ1 1λ(x)Zt≥eA(t)
]
≤ σδ1κ2
θ − σδ1 e
A(t)
(
1+
σδ2
θ −
δ2
δ1
)
E
[
(λ(x)Zt)
δ2
δ1
−σδ2θ
] (66)
and it follows that EH(t, c(t,Wt))− <∞.
To estimate E
∫∞
0
H(t, c(t,Wt))
−dt we use similar arguments to those for
the positive part, but consider the asymptotics of (64) which yield expressions
involving δ1. Then we get
A(t) ≤
(
−θκ1
σδ1
−
(
1− θ
σδ1
)(
θσδ1
2
+ r
))
t.
If we write S := (θ(1− δ2/δ1) + σδ2) > 0, we can compute the expectation as:
EH(t, c(t,Wt))− ≤ σδ1κ2λ(x)
1−S/θ
θ − σδ1 e
A(t)Sθ−(1−S/θ)(rt+Sθt/2)
≤ σδ1κ2λ(x)
1−S/θ
θ − σδ1 e
− tσδ1 (κ1S+(r+σδ1S/2)(σδ1−S)).
We now observe that σδ1−S = (δ2− δ1)(θ−σδ1)/δ1 ≥ 0, and we conclude that
E
∫∞
0
H(t, c(t,Wt))
−dt <∞.
The remaining cases have θ = σδi for some i. We outline the case where θ =
σδ1 and δ1 < δ2, the other cases relying on similar calculations. In this case the
bounds on H(t, c(t,Wt))
+ hold in a similar manner to above, while integrating
(62) and using, for z ≥ eA(t), f(t, z) ≥ (eA(t)z−1)σδ2/θ gives H(t, c(t,Wt))− ≤
κ2e
A(t)σδ2θ
−1 ((A(t))− + (ln(λ(x)Zt))+). We can derive a lower bound on A(t)
in a similar manner to (65), and note that the upper bound also still holds, and
so we see that
∫∞
0
EH(t, c(t,Wt))−dt <
∫∞
0
(C1 + C2t)e
−κ1tdt < ∞ for some
constants C1, C2, which gives the required behaviour. In the remaining cases
where either δ1 < δ2 = θ/σ, or δ1 = δ2 = θ/σ, modifications of the above
arguments hold.
Remark 4.4. In Lemma 4.3 we provide two sufficient conditions which relate
θ, σ and the constants δ1, δ2 which are derived from piw(w). The simpler neces-
sary condition is to require θ ≤ σδ1, however in this case, the utility function
we derive from this consumption/investment pair will necessarily be finite in
the limit as we let c → 0. To allow utility functions which do not display this
behaviour, we include also the second case. Note however that this second case
also contains a subset of cases which are easy to check: if δ1 >
1
2δ2, then it is
easily confirmed that the second necessary condition holds.
Remark 4.5. From the proof it is clear that we do not need to assume time-
homogeneity of pi. Instead we take pi(t, w) ∈ C1,1 and assume (57) and (29).
Then it follows that
κ3(t) := δ˜2 lim
w→0
c(t, w)
pi(t, w)
+
∫ w
1
pit(t, ξ)
pi(t, ξ)2
dξ, κ4(t) := δ˜1 lim
w→∞
c(t, w)
pi(t, w)
+
∫ w
1
pit(t, ξ)
pi(t, ξ)2
dξ
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are well defined. It is then enough to assume that θ/σ ≤ δ˜1 ∧ δ˜2 and further∫∞
0
exp(− ∫ t
0
κ3(u)du)dt <∞ and likewise for κ4(t).
Lemma 4.3 is particularly useful as it allows us to construct a wealth of ex-
amples of non-linear consumption and investment pairs with prescribed desired
behaviour. We explore now a method to obtain convex/concave investment and
consumptions pairs and then present a simple parametric family of examples.
Assume that pi : R+ 7→ R+ is a thrice differentiable, strictly increasing,
concave function such that pi(0) = 0 and
0 < piw(∞−) ≤ piw(w) < piw(0+) <∞, w ∈ (0,∞). (67)
Further, let χ(w) = (pipiw)w(w) = piw(w)
2 +pi(w)piww(w) and assume that there
exists  > 0 such that
− −1 < σ
2
2
χ(w) < r − , w ∈ (0,∞). (68)
The optimal consumption is given by (55) and we assume that it is time ho-
mogenous with β(t) ≡ β ≥ 0. We then have c(0) = 0 and
 ≤ + βpiw(∞−) < cw(w) = r + βpiw(w)− σ
2
2
χ(w) < r + βpiw(0+) + 
−1.
In particular, (57) holds. Provided the Sharpe ratio satisfies (for example) θ ≤
σpiw(∞−) we can apply Lemma 4.3 and conclude that (i) and (ii) in Theorem
3.4 hold true.
By hypothesis pi is concave: the concavity/convexity of c will depend on the
sign of cww = βpiww − σ2χw/2. Noting that piww ≤ 0 we have that if
Cpiww(w) < χw(w) < 0, w ∈ (0,∞), (69)
for some positive constant C then the choice β = 0 gives that c is strictly convex,
whereas the choice β = σ2C/2 gives that c is strictly concave.
Similarly, we can produce examples with pi convex. Suppose that pi is a
thrice differentiable, strictly increasing, convex function such that pi(0) = 0 and
0 < piw(0+) ≤ piw(w) ≤ piw(∞−) < ∞. Then, if we assume again that (68)
holds, we have c such that c(0) = 0 and
 ≤ + βpiw(0+) < cw(w) < r + βpiw(∞−) + −1.
In conclusion, (57) holds and if (for example) θ ≤ σpiw(0+) the assumptions of
Lemma 4.3 are satisfied and (i) and (ii) in Theorem 3.4 follow. If, instead of
(69), we have
Cpiww(w) > χw(w) > 0, w ∈ (0,∞), (70)
then the choice of β = 0 gives a concave consumption while β = σ2C/2 generates
a convex c.
Example 4.6. As an example, take in the above pi(w) = (φw+ψ((1+w)p−1))
with φ, ψ > 0 and 0 < p < 1. Then pi is concave, piw(∞−) = φ and piw(0+) =
φ+ pψ. Furthermore,
χw(w) = pi(w)piwww(w) + 3piw(w)piww(w) = −ψ(1 + w)p−3p(1− p)Λ(w)
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where
Λ(w) = (1 + p)φw + (2− p)ψ + 3φ+ 2(1 + w)pψ(2p− 1).
Suppose that the parameters are such that Λ(w) is positive, a simple sufficient
condition for which is that p ≥ 1/2. Since ψ > 0 it follows that χ is decreasing
and
φ2 = χ(∞) ≤ χ(w) ≤ χ(0) = (φ+ pψ)2
so that (68) follows provided (φ+ pψ)2 < 2r/σ2, a condition we now impose.
We already have χw < 0 so for (69) it suffices to look at the sign of
Cpiww − χw = ψp(1− p)(1 + w)p−3[−C(1 + w) + Λ(w)]. (71)
Since Λ is bounded above by an affine function of w it follows easily that this
expression can be made negative on (0,∞) by choosing C sufficiently large.
Choose the parameters such that Λ(w) > 0, (φ + pψ)2 < 2r/σ2 and either
θ ≤ σφ or both σφ < θ ≤ σ(φ + pψ) and σφ(φ + pψ) > θpψ. Taking β = 0
we obtain an example for which pi is concave and c is convex, and conversely,
taking β sufficiently large, we obtain an example with both pi and c concave.
To obtain examples with convex pi consider now φ > 0, 0 < p < 1 but ψ < 0.
Assume also that φ+pψ > 0 and φ2 < 2r/σ2. Then pi is increasing, convex with
φ+ pψ = piw(0+) < piw(w) < piw(∞−) = φ. Suppose again that the parameters
are such that Λ(w) is positive. In fact, given Λ(0) = 3(φ+ pψ) > 0, p ≤ 1/2 is
a simple sufficient condition. It follows that χ(w) is increasing with
(φ+ pψ)2 = χ(0) ≤ χ(w) ≤ χ(∞) = φ2
so that (68) holds under the condition φ2 < 2r/σ2. Further, (71) can be made
uniformly positive for large C and hence (70) holds. Lemma 4.3 applies with
either θ ≤ σ(φ+ pψ) or both σ(φ+ pψ) < θ ≤ σφ and θpψ > −σφ(φ+ pψ). We
conclude that if we take β = 0 we obtain an example with convex investment
and a concave consumption. Conversely, if we take β sufficiently large we get an
example with both pi and c convex. A numerical example for this case is given
in Figure 1. Note that convexity of c implies DARA by Proposition 4.1.
Our general approach easily allows us to obtain admissible sets of parameters
with additional convexity and concavity properties. Note, however, that even
when the arguments for the convexity/concavity fail, it is still straightforward
to write down expressions for cw and analyse it explicitly. In particular, when
ψ > 0 we see that β > σ
2
2φ (φ+pψ)
2 guarantees that cw is bounded and bounded
away from zero. As above, Lemma 4.3 applies with either θ ≤ σφ or both
σφ < θ ≤ σ(φ + pψ) and σφ(φ + pψ) > θpψ. A numerical example which
satisfies these conditions but for which Λ(w) goes negative is given in Figure
2. It also features a risk aversion which is first decreasing, then increasing and
then decreasing again.
Example 4.7. We present another example where consumption has a simple
convex expresion in wealth. Consider
pi(w) =
2
σ
√
r − κ
2
w2 + αw +
α
a
(e−aw − 1), (72)
where we take r > κ > 0, α, a > 0 with κ > aα. Clearly pi(w) is an increasing
function of w and
δ2 = piw(0+) =
√
2
σ
√
r − κ+ αa, δ1 = piw(∞−) =
√
2
σ
√
r − κ.
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Figure 1: Graphs for Example 4.6 when piww > 0. Top panes: The investment
strategy pi(w) (left) and the corresponding optimal consumption c(w) (right)
for parameters: r = 0.3, θ = 0.026, σ = 0.25, β = 10, p = 1/30, φ = 2.1 and
ψ = −60. Bottom panes: The absolute risk aversion ρ(t, c) = ρ(c) (left) inferred
from these actions and a compatible utility function u(0.1, c) (right).
From (55), with β(t) ≡ 0, we recover the optimal consumption as
c(w) = κw + α
(
e−aw − 1) (73)
which is an increasing convex function with cww(w) = a
2αe−aw. Sufficient
conditions for pi, c to satisfy the assumptions of Lemma 4.3 are then concav-
ity of pi (from which we deduce δ1 ≤ piw(w) ≤ δ2) and either θ ≤
√
2(r − κ) or√
2(r − κ) < θ ≤√2(r − κ+ aα) and θ+√2(r − κ+ aα)) > θ√1 + aα/(r − κ).
We will verify the concavity condition numerically for the cases of interest pre-
sented in Figure 3. Note that in this example c is convex and pi is increasing so
Proposition 4.1 implies that the agent employing these actions necessarily has
a decreasing absolute risk aversion.
4.4 Extensions to Theorem 3.4
Our goal in Theorem 3.4 was to present an if and only if statement of our main
result in the regular case. In this section we talk about a few of the extensions
which are possible.
Firstly, note that in (i) of Theorem 3.4 we only assume regularity on u and
in (ii) we only assume regularity on c, pi. With a standing assumption that
pi is continuously differentiable in both arguments the equivalence holds under
weaker definitions of regularity. In (i) it is then enough to require that u(t, ·)
is once (and not twice) continuously differentiable and we can drop Ho¨lder
continuity of Iz. In (ii) we then need that c is jointly continuous instead of
differentiability in w and Ho¨lder continuity of cw. The key point is that we need
to guarantee the existence of gtz in the second part of the proof of the theorem,
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Figure 2: Graphs for Example 4.6 when piww < 0. Top panes: The investment
strategy pi(w) (left) and the corresponding optimal consumption c(w) (right)
for parameters: r = 0.05, θ = 0.13, σ = 0.25, β = 10, p = 1/5, φ = 0.5 and
ψ = 60. Bottom panes: The absolute risk aversion ρ(t, c) = ρ(c) (left) inferred
from these actions and a compatible utility function u(0.1, c) (right).
and this can be done either with the assumptions of the theorem, or with weaker
conditions if pi is assumed to be continuously differentiable.
Another possible extension is to drop the Inada conditions on u. The impli-
cations of not requiring uc(t, 0) =∞— in particular, consumption may be zero
for an interval of positive wealths to the right of zero — is considered in He and
Huang (1994).
Instead of pursuing this idea, for the rest of this section we will consider
what happens if agent’s utility includes a satiation point, or in the inverse
case where we start with c and pi, if the consumption is a bounded function of
wealth. This may or may not imply that agent’s wealth is bounded (and below
we give examples which cover the two cases), but in the case where the wealth
is bounded, there are similarities with the ‘maximal’ wealth path w(t), which
arose in the deterministic setting.
Implicit in the definitions and results of Section 3.3 (and in Black (1968),
Cox and Leland (2000), He and Huang (1994)) is the idea that the agent follows
a strategy such that his wealth is unbounded in ω for each t. The result below
considers the case where the consumption c(t, w) may be bounded above, and
then W xt ≤ w(t) a.s. where w(t) = ert
∫∞
t
e−rsc(s,∞)ds which may be finite or
infinite. In the former case, the agent consumes and invests in such a way that
his wealth is kept below w(t) with probability one. We relate this explicitly to
the properties of the utility function.
The following definition relaxes the notions from Definitions 3.2 and 3.3.
Definition 4.8. (i) We say that a function u : [0,∞)2 → [−∞,∞) is a regular
utility function if for any t ≥ 0 there exists c(t) > 0 such that u(t, ·) is twice
continuously differentiable, strictly concave and increasing on {(t, c) ∈ (0,∞)2 :
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Figure 3: Graphs for Example 4.7. Top panes: The investment strategy pi(w)
(left) in (72) and the corresponding optimal consumption c(w) (right) in (73)
for parameters: κ = 0.4, σ = 0.25, r = 0.6, α = 0.1, a = 1.25, θ = 0.95. Bottom
panes: The absolute risk aversion ρ(t, c) = ρ(c) (left) inferred from these actions
and a compatible utility function u(0.1, c) (right).
c < c(t)}, satisfies the Inada condition: uc(t, 0+) = ∞ and uc(t, c(t)−) = 0,
and u(t, c) is constant for c ≥ c(t). Further, Iz is locally Ho¨lder continuous on
(0,∞)2.
(ii) We say that (c, pi) is a regular consumption/investment pair if
• for each t ≥ 0, c(t, 0) = 0, c(t, ·) is increasing and we have w(t) :=
ert
∫∞
t
e−rsc(s,∞)ds > 0. Further, c(t, ·) is strictly increasing and differ-
entiable on [0, w(t)) and constant and equal to c(t, w(t)−) on [w(t),∞).
Finally, cw(t, w) is locally Ho¨lder continuous on {(t, w) ∈ (0,∞)2 : w <
w(t)}.
• for each t ≥ 0, pi(t, 0) = 0, pi(t, ·) is strictly positive and continuously dif-
ferentiable in both arguments on {(t, w) ∈ (0,∞)2 : w < w(t)}. Further,∫
0+
dξ/pi(t, ξ) = ∞ = ∫ w(t) dξ/pi(t, ξ) and pi(t, w) = 0 for w ≥ w(t) when
w(t) <∞.
Finally, c, pi are such that the SDE (38) has a strong solution for x < w(0).
In addition, the definitions of β, A, H and F may need to be modified. If
w(t) > ξ > 0 for all t ≥ 0 then it suffices to replace 1 in the lower bound of
the integration in (29) and (39) by ξ. More generally, when (pi, c) is a regular
consumption/investment pair as given by the Definition 4.8, we have that w(t) is
continuous and strictly positive and then there exists a smooth function w0(t)
such that 0 < w0(t) < w(t). Thus we can replace the bottom limit in the
integrals in (29) and (39) with w0(t), and replace A(t) in (39) with
A0(t) = − θ
σ
∫ t
0
β(s)ds+
(
θ2
2
− r
)
t−
∫ t
0
θw′0(s)
σpi(s, w0(s))
ds.
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Similarly, if c(t) is not bounded below by 1, then we replace the lower limit
in the definition of H with c0(t) where c0(t) < c(t) is some strictly positive
function. Then H(t, c) =
∫ c
c0(t)
F (t, Y (t, b))db.
Theorem 4.9. For any x > 0, the following are equivalent:
(i) c(t,W xt ) and pi(t,W
x
t ) achieve a finite maximum in the problem (43) for a
regular utility function u of Definition 4.8 for which (44) holds, and where
c, pi : [0,∞)2 → [0,∞) are such that if w(t) := inf{w > 0 : pi(t, w) = 0} <
∞ then pi(t, w) = 0, c(t, w) = c(t, w(t)) for w ≥ w(t).
(ii) c(t, w), pi(t, w) are a regular consumption/investment pair of Definition
4.8 which satisfy (29) on {(t, w) ∈ (0,∞)2 : w < w(t)}, (45) holds and
for some 0 < x0 ≤ x, E[|H(t, c(t,W x0t ))|] < ∞ for almost all t ≥ 0 and∫∞
0
E[H(t, c(t,W x0t ))− h(t)]+dt <∞, where h(t) = E[H(t, c(t,W x0t ))].
Moreover, we then have uc(t, c) = Hc(t, c), and in (i) one may take u(t, c) =
H(t, c)− h(t) for c ≤ c(t).
Remark 4.10. The theorem holds if in the definition of a regular consump-
tion/investment pair w(t) is just some function and we do not impose the con-
sistency condition that w(t) := ert
∫∞
t
e−rsc(s,∞)ds. This condition is in fact
implied by Black’s equation (29) which gives W xt = f(t, F (0, x)Zt) and by the
budget equation (45), as is clear from the proof of (i)⇒ (ii).
Proof. The proof is almost identical to the proof of Theorem 3.4. In the
first part, when showing (ii) ⇒ (i), observe that u(t, c) = H(t, c) − h(t) is
strictly increasing and concave on [0, c(t)) and constant on [c(t),∞), where
c(t) = c(t,∞) = c(t, w(t)). We have uc(t, 0) = F (t, Y (t, 0)) = F (t, 0) = ∞,
uc(t, c(t)) = F (t, Y (t, c(t))) = F (t, w(t)) = 0 and ucc(t, l) is continuous on
(0, c(t)). In addition, I(t, z) = c(t, f(t, z)) and f is well defined and C1,2 on
(0,∞)2. In consequence, Iz(t, z) is locally Ho¨lder continuous and u is a regular
utility function of Definition 4.8. The modified definition of F (t, w) (note in
particular that (40)–(42) still hold) is important in (46), where the additional
terms in A0(t) cancel with the extra term in Ft arising from the new definition.
For the second part of the proof, the implication (i) ⇒ (ii), recall that
now c(t) is defined from u in Definition 4.8. When we show that c(t,W xt ) =
I(t, λZt) this implies c(t,W
x
t ) < c(t). Then, from the representation of g as the
conditional expectation, letting Zt → 0 and using the Dominated Convergence
Theorem, we obtain that c and w are related by w(t) = ert
∫∞
t
e−rsc(s)ds.
We conclude that c(t, 0) = 0, c(t, ·) is strictly increasing on (0, g(t, 0)), and
c(t, g(t, 0)) = c(t). Further, cw(t, w) is locally Ho¨lder continuous on {(t, w) ∈
(0,∞)2 : w < g(t, 0)}. As previously, (30)–(31) hold with g instead of f , for
all t, z > 0. It follows that pi(t, 0) = 0, and pi(t, w) > 0 for 0 < w < g(t, 0).
Moreover, if g(t, 0) <∞ then gz(t, 0) > −∞ and pi(t, g(t, 0)) = 0. It follows from
the assumed properties of c, pi that g(t, 0) = w(t) and c(t) = c(t,∞). Similarly,
we conclude that (29) holds for {(t, w) ∈ (0,∞)2 : w < w(t)}. Finally, the last
change is that now
τ = inf{s : Zs /∈ (F (s, w(s))/F (0, x), F (s, 0)/F (0, x))} = inf{s : W˜s ∈ {0, w(s)}}
and 0 < W xt < w(t) a.s. implies that τ = ∞; i.e. F (t, 0) = ∞ and F (t, w(t)) =
0.
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Example 4.11. We now present an example where the situation as above holds:
both the agent’s consumption and her wealth process are bounded. Consider
the time-homogeneous setting with pi(w) = max{w(1− w), 0} and
c(w) = w
(
r − 1
2
σ2 + β
)
+ w2
(
3
2
σ2 − β
)
− w3σ2, w ∈ (0, 1),
with c(w) = r for w ≥ 1. We shall suppose that r > 12σ2 and |β| < r − 12σ2.
Observe that c(0) = 0, c is strictly increasing on (0, 1) with derivative bounded
away from zero and infinity and c is continuous on (0,∞). Further, we have
w(t) ≡ 1 = ∫∞
t
er(t−s)c(1)ds. In particular, (c, pi) are a regular consump-
tion/investment pair which satisfy (29) as described above. Moreover, since
Wt is bounded above, similar arguments to those used at the start of the proof
of Lemma 4.3 can be used to deduce (45). Finally, we can also check the in-
tegrability conditions of (ii) of Theorem 4.9. Then we can conclude that there
exists a regular utility function for which this consumption and investment are
optimal.
First note that we have
F (t, w) = eA(t)
(
w
1− w
)−θ/σ
,
so that
1
2
w−θ/σ1{w<δ} ≤ e−A(t)F (t, w) ≤ w−θ/σ (74)
for w ∈ (0, 1), and for some δ < 12 . Again, as in the proof of Lemma 4.3, we can
write
H(t, c(t, w)) =
∫ w
1
2
F (t, w˜)cw(t, w˜)dw˜.
Since cw is bounded from above and below for w ∈ (0, 1), then we deduce from
(74) thatH(t, c(t, w))+ ≤ κ1eA(t) for some constant κ1 > 0, andH(t, c(t, w))− ≤
κ2e
A(t) when θ < σ, and H(t, c(t, w))− ≤ κ3eA(t)w1−θ/σ when θ > σ, for some
κ2, κ3 > 0. (We exclude the case θ = σ). Writing f(t, z) for the inverse of
F (t, w) and using (74), we get f(t, Zt) ≤ eA(t)σ/θ(Zt ∨K)−σ/θ, for some K > 0,
and we conclude that the desired integrability conditions hold provided∫ ∞
0
eA(t)σ/θ
(
E
[
Z
1−σ/θ
t
]
+K1−σ/θ
)
dt <∞.
Calculations similar to those in the proof of Lemma 4.3 show that this will hold
whenever:
β − σθ + r − 1
2
σ2 > 0 and A(1) = − θ
σ
β +
1
2
θ2 − r < 0.
It is now clear that there are non-trivial parameter choices for which this exam-
ple satisfies the conditions of Theorem 4.9, and therefore, such that there exists
a utility function u for which these are the optimal investment/consumption
pair.
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Figure 4: Graphs for Example 4.11. Top panes: The investment strategy pi(w) =
w(1−w)∨ 0 (left) and the corresponding optimal consumption c(w) (right) for
parameters: r = 0.5, θ = 0.7, σ = 0.25, β = 0.1. Bottom panes: The absolute
risk aversion ρ(1, c) (left) inferred from these actions and a compatible utility
function u(1, c) (right) which is constant on [r,∞).
Example 4.12. Finally, we present an example in which the consumption is
bounded while the agent’s wealth is unbounded. Consider the time-homogeneous
setting with pi(w) = 1− e−w and
c(w) =
(
β − σ
2
2
e−w
)
pi(w), w ≥ 0.
We assume r = 0, θ < σ and β > σ2. It follows that c is an increasing function
with c(0) = 0 and c(∞) = β. Further, pi, c satisfy Black’s equation (29) as c is
given by (55). Explicit computations yield
F (t, w) = eA(t) (ew − 1)−θ/σ , f(t, z) = log
(
eA(t)σ/θz−σ/θ + 1
)
,
where we used log 2 instead of 1 as the lower bound of integration in (39).
Then c, pi are a regular consumption/investment pair of Definition 4.8 with
w(t) = ∞ = ∫∞
t
c(∞)ds, and we note that F (t,∞) = 0 as required. Similarly
to Example 4.11 above, it is easy to see that H(t, c(t, w)) ≤ κeA(t) when θ < σ.
Likewise, with arguments akin to that in the proof of Lemma 4.3, we obtain
that W xt → 0 and (45) is equivalent to showing that EQ[W xt ] → 0. To verify
this we use Remark 3.5 and compute
EQ[W xt ] = EQ[f(t, F (0, x)Zt)] = EQ
[
log
(
eσ(Bt+θt)−βt(ex − 1) + 1
)]
≤ log
(
EQ
[
eσ(Bt+θt)−βt(ex − 1) + 1
])
= log
(
e−(β−σ
2/2)t(ex − 1) + 1
)
→ 0,
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Figure 5: Graphs for Example 4.12. Top panes: The investment strategy pi(w) =
(1 − e−w) (left) and the corresponding optimal consumption c(w) (right) for
parameters: r = 0, θ = 0.25, σ = 0.5, β = 0.3. Bottom panes: The absolute
risk aversion ρ(t, c) = ρ(c) (left) inferred from these actions and a compatible
utility function u(0.1, c) (right) which is constant on [β,∞).
as t → ∞, and where we used Jensen’s inequality, the fact that Bt + θt is a
Q–Brownian motion and the assumption β > σ2/2. Finally, note that β ≥ σ2/2
and θ < σ together imply A(1) = − θσβ + 12θ2 < 0 and we conclude that all the
assumptions in (ii) in Theorem 4.9 are satisfied.
5 Further research
The work presented in this paper may be seen as the first step which motivates
exploration of a set of wider related questions. Our underpinning principle is
to start with those actions which may be observed in an investor’s behaviour,
and then attempt to determine whether their actions are consistent with utility
maximisation. In this paper, we have considered two cases: a deterministic
setup and a stochastic complete market setup. In the deterministic case, our
fundamental conclusion is that observing investor’s actions for any given wealth
is not enough to fully specify their utility. Risk aversion remains unspecified. In
the stochastic case, we suppose we observe both consumption and investment.
Then the assumption that the investor is maximising utility implies that the
consistency constraint (29) holds. These two studies would have natural, and
interesting, analogues in other markets such as one period models (where the
investor can choose to consume now or in the subsequent period), or, at the other
extreme in terms of complexity, continuous-time models which are incomplete
(e.g. a stochastic factor model). The questions parallel to those which we have
answered here would include:
• is specifying an investor’s consumption and investment strategies sufficient
to determine their utility function (up to constants)?
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• If it is not, is the system over-specified or under-specified?
In the case where the system is over-specified, we might expect a consistency
condition such as Black’s equation, (29), and it is interesting to ask whether
there is a more general optimisation problem such as (19) which may correspond
to the general choice of consumption and investment.
Following on from Section 4.1, it would be interesting to incorporate a form
of model uncertainty and ask if agents’ actions may arise from maximising some
utility under some dynamics of the price process. Within our framework, the
scope for such questions was limited since we only considered Black-Scholes
dynamics for the price process. A more extensive study could be based on the
work of He and Huang (1994), see also Example 3 therein, or follow on from the
research suggested above.
An even more ambitious task would be to consider an inverse problem to
the classical analysis of decision making under model uncertainty (also called
Knightian uncertainty). In that framework, one specifies actors’ preferences
and a way to quantify their uncertainty about the true price dynamics. One
then asks what are the actors’ optimal actions, see e.g. Schied (2007), Fo¨llmer
et al. (2009). The inverse approach would start with agents’ actions and try to
recover their preferences as well as their belief about model uncertainty.
Finally, a nice feature of the paper is that we have been able to go beyond
simply recovering the utility function, and have also been able to provide char-
acterisations of certain aspects of the agent’s behaviour (absolute and relative
risk aversion) in terms of the given data. In more complex situations, where it
may not be possible to fully recover an agent’s utility function, it may still be
possible to deduce some of these related properties from the given data.
We believe the questions raised above form an exciting research programme
and we hope to pursue some of them in subsequent work.
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